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PLATFORMS AND THE FALL OF THE FOURTH ESTATE:
LOOKING BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO PROTECT
WATCHDOG JOURNALISM
ERIN C. CARROLL *
INTRODUCTION
Even in a city of monuments, the Newseum was striking. Called a
“cathedral” to the First Amendment and the free press, it sat along a stretch
of Pennsylvania Avenue that connects the White House and the United States
Capitol. 1 On its façade was a fifty-ton Tennessee marble plaque carved with
all forty-five words of the First Amendment. 2 Its 250,000 square feet
contained some 6214 journalistic artifacts, including paeans to the press’s
watchdog role, like the hotel door from the Watergate break-in. 3
Despite its grandeur, however, the Newseum teetered on insolvency for
years. 4 Its executive director hastily stepped down in 2017. 5 Its benefactor,
the Freedom Forum, then sold the Pennsylvania Avenue building, which
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1. See Sopan Deb, The Newseum Is Increasingly Relevant, But Can It Survive?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/arts/design/the-newseum-is-increasinglyrelevant-but-can-it-survive.html; About, NEWSEUM, http://www.newseum.org/about/ (last visited
Oct. 2, 2019).
2. See Deb, supra note 1; Jack Shafer, The Newseum Deserves to Die, POLITICO MAG. (Aug.
29, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/29/newseum-journalism-artifactsfailure-215554.
3. See Jack Shafer, Down with the Newseum!, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2008, 4:22 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/press_box/2008/02/down_with_the_newseum.ht
ml.
4. See Roger Yu, The Newseum CEO Steps Down as It Considers Selling, Closing, USA
TODAY (Aug. 30, 2017, 4:03 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/08/30/newseumceo-steps-down-considers-selling-closing/616609001/.
5. Margaret Sullivan, Newseum’s President Steps Down as Financial Review Begins, WASH.
POST (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/newseums-president-stepsdown-as-financial-review-begins/2017/08/28/bc76218e-8c52-11e7-91d5ab4e4bb76a3a_story.html?utm_term=.d4ac02649aa1.
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some had valued at nearly $700 million, for about half that amount. 6 Then
on December 31, 2019, the Newseum closed. 7
Its struggle was no surprise. As The Washington Post’s media
columnist Margaret Sullivan wrote before it closed, “It doesn’t require a PhD
in comparative literature to see the Newseum’s troubles as a metaphor for the
besieged state of the American press.” 8
The comparison runs deeper, however. The Newseum’s failure is not
only a metaphor for the deterioration of an institution but is also emblematic
of a strained relationship between constitutional law and the press. The limits
of the First Amendment—understood by generations of journalists as an
amulet—are becoming more apparent. Despite the press’s heralded role as a
bulwark of our democracy, it is unclear if our living Constitution can stretch
far and fast enough to protect it. 9
The very nature of the press has changed. The First Amendment was
shaped for and by a conception of the press that is no longer descriptively
accurate: the Fourth Estate. The Fourth Estate metaphor captures the
understanding of the press as being both an institution and independent.
Implicit in the metaphor is also that the press will serve as a check on
government power and potential abuse by shining a light on its actions.10 The
Framers sought to create and protect this structural role for the press. The
text of the First Amendment itself reflects this aim. Its admonition that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the

6. See Nick Anderson & Peggy McGlone, Johns Hopkins to Buy Newseum Building in D.C.
as Journalism Museum Plans to Relocate, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2019, 5:30 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2019/01/25/johns-hopkins-buy-newseum-buildingdc-journalism-museum-plans-relocate/?utm_term=.deed7ef5b857; Peggy McGlone & Manuel
Roig-Franzia, “A Slow-Motion Disaster”: Journalism Museum in Talks About Possible Building
Sale,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
7,
2018,
5:32
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/museums/a-slow-motion-disaster-journalismmuseum-in-talks-about-possible-building-sale/2018/02/07/1f816480-0c2f-11e8-95a5c396801049ef_story.html?utm_term=.84f56d688d92.
7. About, NEWSEUM, https://www.newseum.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2020).
8. Margaret Sullivan, The Newseum Opened as the Journalism Industry Tanked. No Wonder
POST
(Aug.
29,
2017),
It’s
in
Deep
Trouble,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-newseum-opened-as-the-journalism-industrytanked-no-wonder-its-in-deep-trouble/2017/08/29/4566f240-8cbf-11e7-84c002cc069f2c37_story.html?utm_term=.78071182991f.
9. See William Blackstone, Libels; Liberty of the Press, reprinted in THE FIRST AMENDMENT
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 66
(Garrett Epps ed., 2008) (noting that “[t]he liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a
free state”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Marquis de Lafayette (Nov. 4, 1823),
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FOEA-print-04-02-02-3843 (“[T]he
only security of all is in a free press.”).
10. LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 273 (1985); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE
FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 233–34 (1991);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 131–33 (1992).
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press,” explicitly protects press autonomy. 11 By enshrining press freedom in
the Constitution, the Framers were protecting editorial discretion against
what they viewed as its greatest threat: government tyranny. They helped to
create conditions under which watchdog reporting—by which the press
investigates and checks government corruption and malfeasance—could
thrive. But the press itself has changed, and the threats to its freedom and its
ability to check government have shifted as well.
As technology has transformed any number of industries, it has
permanently upended the press. The press’s economic model has been
decimated. Two companies, Google and Facebook, now take most of the
advertising revenue that fueled the press in the twentieth century. 12 From
2001 to 2016, more than half of the news industry jobs in the United States
disappeared, 13 and the term “news deserts” has been coined to describe the
The strength of
many communities without local journalism. 14
newspapers—the longtime core of the Fourth Estate and the primary source
of reporting on civic and governmental affairs—has withered. 15 News
organizations have scaled back lobbying and are less likely to sue to protect
their right to gather information, protect sources, and publish. 16
The Fourth Estate has now been subsumed into a new entity: the
Networked Press. 17 The Networked Press is not an institution—an
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. See Nitasha Tiku, Publishers Could Get a New Weapon Against Facebook and Google,
WIRED (Mar. 7, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/bill-would-let-publishers-gang-upversus-facebook-and-google/.
13. See Sasha Lekach, Fewer Than Half of Newspaper Jobs from 15 Years Ago Still Exist,
MASHABLE (Apr. 4, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/04/04/newspaper-publishers-jobs-declinebls/#a9KxxBTdXsqF.
14. Yemile Bucay, et al., America’s Growing News Deserts, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
Spring 2017.
15. See Matthew Nisbet et al., Funding the News: Foundations and Nonprofit Media (June 18,
2018) (working paper), https://shorensteincenter.org/funding-the-news-foundations-and-nonprofitmedia/ (“For decades, newspapers produced the journalism that did the most to inform public debate
and to hold those in power accountable. Even as the media system rapidly evolved over the past 20
years, studies found that newspapers remained at the core of the country’s information ecology . . . .
During this period, however, most newspapers also suffered a catastrophic collapse in revenue, a
greatly diminished workforce, and a corresponding loss in editorial capacity.”).
16. See RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-Newspaper
America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 559–60 (2011).
17. Scholars have used numerous labels to describe the current press ecology. The “Networked
Press” is taken from the work of communications scholar Professor Mike Ananny who describes its
members as including “journalists, software engineers, algorithms, relational databases, social
media platforms, and quantified audiences.” MIKE ANANNY, NETWORKED PRESS FREEDOM:
CREATING INFRASTRUCTURES FOR A PUBLIC RIGHT TO HEAR 4 (2018). I prefer the term because
of its focus on a web of actors, as opposed to other labels, including the “Networked Fourth Estate,”
the “Fifth Estate,” and the “Platform Press,” which focus either on the legacy press or technology
platforms. See Emily Bell & Taylor Owen, The Platform Press: How Silicon Valley Reengineered
Journalism,
COLUM.
JOURNALISM
REV.
(Mar.
29,
2017),
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organization of individuals bound by common norms, goals, and purpose.
Rather, it is a web of interconnected actors whose aims and values differ. It
includes journalists who share a commitment to being a check on
government, a check that enhances citizens’ ability to be self-governing. But
it also includes technology platforms, software engineers, algorithms, news
consumers, and others who do not share the press’s (or necessarily one
another’s) values and commitments. All of these actors—human and nonhuman—now contribute to how news is made and disseminated. 18
Although they are interconnected, the actors in the Networked Press are
not equally powerful, and the disparities significantly impact journalistic
independence and editorial discretion. Whereas in the twentieth century, the
Fourth Estate controlled the flow of information to the public, now, platforms
like Facebook, Google, Apple, and Twitter are the information gatekeepers. 19
They curate and prioritize a growing amount of the information, including
news, that citizens consume. 20 Their ever-shifting algorithms help determine
if news goes viral or falls flat. These algorithms—formulas for deciding what

https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/platform-press-how-silicon-valley-reengineeredjournalism.php/; Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle Over the
Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 311 (2011); Adam Cohen,
The Media That Need Citizens: The First Amendment and the Fifth Estate, 85 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1,
3 (2011).
18. See Pete Brown, et al., Local Audiences Consuming News on Social Platforms Are Hungry
for
Transparency,
COLUM.
JOURNALISM
REV.
(Oct.
24,
2017),
https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/focus-groups-news-media-diet.php
(“More
people
discover news through algorithms than through (human) editors.”). Notably, Apple News seems to
be having success using a hybrid approach of algorithms and some human editing. News publishers
pitch Apple stories via a Slack channel, and Apple’s editorial staff of about a dozen employees in
the United States then decides which stories to feature. See Pete Brown, Study: Apple News’s
Human Editors Prefer a Few Major Newsrooms, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (June 5, 2018),
https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/study-apple-newss-human-editors-prefer-a-few-majornewsrooms.php. Yet, Apple has been criticized for deprioritizing local news. See Nicholas
Diakopoulos, Apple News Is Excluding Local Newsrooms from Its Coveted Traffic Bump, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/apple-news-localjournalism.php?utm_source=Daily+Lab+email+list&utm_campaign=2f0a961c1bdailylabemail3&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d68264fd5e-2f0a961c1b-396214909.
19. Throughout this Article, I use “platforms” to refer to companies like Google, Apple, and
Facebook. By platform, I mean:
Large technology companies that have developed and maintain digital platforms that
enable interaction between at least two different kinds of actors[;] who in the process
come to host public information, organize access to it, create new formats for it, and
control data about it[;] and who thereby influence incentive structures around investment
in public communication (including news production).
See Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, The Power of Platforms, Inaugural Lecture at Green Templeton College
at University of Oxford (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.slideshare.net/RasmusKleisNielsen/thepower-of-platforms-inaugural-lecture-by-rasmus-kleis-nielsen-u-of-oxford.
20. See Bell & Owen, supra note 17 (“Social media and search companies are not purely
neutral platforms, but in fact edit, or ‘curate,’ the information they present.”).
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information reaches users—are opaque. 21 Many have argued that they’ve
become so complex that platform engineers themselves cannot fully
understand how they work. 22
Relatedly, consumers of news exert tremendous sway over what news
is produced. 23 More and more, automation and data are influencing or
supplanting human news judgment. Large news organizations have teams of
employees devoted to studying and reacting to analytics that show what news
consumers are reading and watching, where, and for how long. 24 Individual
journalists, too, are often reliant on data; this reliance can give them the sense
of being a contestant in a never-ending popularity contest. 25
As the institution of the Fourth Estate shrinks and weakens, and
platforms alter the exercise of editorial discretion, watchdog journalism is
threatened. Watchdog journalism is expensive and time-consuming to
produce. 26 It is also not as widely read as more cheaply produced breaking
news. 27 A Networked Press regime does not incentivize watchdog
journalism. News under this new press model is increasingly dominated by
what will garner engagement and social sharing—the palace intrigue and the
hot take rather than the painstaking investigation of government malfeasance.

21. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) (describing the black-box nature of algorithms).
22. See, e.g., Adrienne LaFrance, Not Even the People Who Write Algorithms Really Know
(Sept.
18,
2015),
How
They
Work,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/09/not-even-the-people-who-writealgorithms-really-know-how-they-work/406099/; Christopher Mims, How Facebook’s Master
Algorithm Powers the Social Network, a “Modular Layered Cake,” Extracts Meaning from Every
Post and Photo, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/howfacebooks-master-algorithm-powers-the-social-network-1508673600
(“AI
algorithms
are
inherently black boxes whose workings can be next to impossible to understand—even by many
Facebook engineers.”).
23. See WHITNEY PHILLIPS, DATA & SOC’Y, THE OXYGEN OF AMPLIFICATION: BETTER
PRACTICES FOR REPORTING ON EXTREMISTS, ANTAGONISTS, AND MANIPULATORS ONLINE 7
(2018),
https://datasociety.net/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/FULLREPORT_Oxygen_of_Amplification_DS.pdf (“In the social media
age, the measurability and commoditization of content, in the form of traffic, clicks, and likes, has
tethered editorial strategy to analytics like never before.”).
24. See Nia Decaille Joins the Audience Team, WASH. POST: WASHPOSTPR (Oct. 2, 2017,
10:26 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/pr/wp/2017/10/02/nia-decaille-joins-the-audienceteam/?utm_term=.d6576e8cb441 (describing an employee’s job as “serv[ing] audiences who come
to us via search engines” and “coaching writers on social and search best practices”).
25. See FRANKLIN FOER, WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH
144–45 (2017).
26. See James T. Hamilton, Subsidizing the Watchdog: What Would It Cost to Support
Investigative Journalism at a Large Metropolitan Daily Newspaper, DUKE CONF. ON NONPROFIT
MEDIA 3–4 (2009), www2.sanford.duke.edu/nonprofitmedia/documents/dwchamiltonfinal.pdf.
27. See PABLO J. BOCZKOWSKI & EUGENIA MITCHELSTEIN, THE NEWS GAP 2 (2013) (noting
the popularity of news about weather, sports, crime, and entertainment).
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The First Amendment was crafted, in part, to shield the watchdog
function from government interference, and it has. The press-as-Fourth
Estate has fit relatively comfortably under the First Amendment’s protective
umbrella. Key Supreme Court cases have blocked the government from
interfering with the press and allowed the press to exercise editorial
discretion and publish government secrets. 28 So far, indications are that
courts will protect journalists from perhaps the most visible form of
government interference: hostile treatment by the anti-press White House. 29
Yet, the protections the Framers put in place are not sufficiently
protecting watchdog journalism in the Networked Press era. The press
remains legally shielded from government interference but not from the
encroachment of the private sphere. As platforms grow more powerful, it is
clearer what a significant threat private companies can be to the press’s
watchdog role. Various private interests—including advertisers and
audiences—have always tethered the “free” press, but the tether of platforms
on the press is especially suffocating because of their immense scale and
power.
Platforms are not singlehandedly responsible for the technological
changes that have decimated the press’s economic model and its ability to
robustly fund watchdog reporting. 30 Many forces and entities have played a
part, including the press itself. Platforms are doing little, however, to abate
the threat. They have repeatedly shunned the responsibilities to citizens and
democracy long shouldered by investigative journalists.31 Rather, they
embrace and reify features of technology that harm the environment for
watchdog reporting. Platforms’ tether on the press is restricting the press’s
ability to perform its constitutionally prescribed function.
No shortage of legal scholarship exists on the relationship between the
press and the First Amendment. 32 Likewise, whether and how the First

28. See infra Section I.B.
29. See Paul Farhi, Judge Hands CNN a Victory in Its Bid to Restore Jim Acosta’s White House
POST
(Nov.
16,
2018,
4:37
PM),
Press
Pass,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/judge-hands-cnn-victory-in-its-bid-to-restore-jimacostas-white-house-press-pass/2018/11/16/8bedd08a-e920-11e8-a9399469f1166f9d_story.html?utm_term=.2f4f5cd9daf9.
30. Of course, platforms are also not solely responsible for the loss of journalism jobs. In 2018,
The Denver Post laid off a third of its newsroom even though it was turning a profit for its hedgefund owner. See Alex Shephard, The Local News Crisis Is Bigger Than Sinclair, NEW REPUBLIC
(Apr. 3, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/147735/local-news-crisis-bigger-sinclair.
31. See, e.g., Mike Isaac, Facebook, in Cross Hairs After Election, Is Said to Question Its
Influence, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/14/technology/facebookis-said-to-question-its-influence-in-election.html (noting that Mark Zuckerberg called the
possibility that Facebook had affected the 2016 presidential election “a pretty crazy idea”).
32. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002);
Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the
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Amendment applies to new forms of speech online has proved fertile (and
necessary) ground for legal scholars to till. 33 Less scholarship, however, has
focused on the intersection of the First Amendment, the press, and new
technology. More examination of how platforms, social media, and
algorithms are impacting the press and the journalistic process is needed. We
need to think harder about when and how law should respond to these
changes. This Article will be a contribution to that effort.
Part I will examine the inextricability of the First Amendment and the
Fourth Estate. It will establish that the vision the Framers had of “the press”
as conveyed by the First Amendment was likely multifaceted and difficult to
categorize. Yet, evidence exists that it tracked the qualities inherent to the
Fourth Estate metaphor. The Framers viewed the press as having three
qualities. First, the press was an institution. Second, it was independent
(meaning that it could freely exercise editorial discretion). Finally, it served
as a structural check on the government. 34 The Fourth Estate metaphor was
cemented in a series of pro-press Supreme Court opinions in the midtwentieth century. 35 Not coincidentally, the press truly was a Fourth Estate
at this time. In this way, the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence and the
Fourth Estate were mutually reinforcing. 36
Part II will describe the rift developing between the Supreme Court’s
conception of the press and its role and the modern-day practice of
journalism. In the last twenty years, technology has radically transformed
the media. It has undermined the economic model for newspapers and
consequently weakened the institutional Fourth Estate. In the last decade,
the circle of actors playing press roles has expanded. Platforms have seized
the role of gatekeeper, but they have been reluctant to assume the
responsibilities to citizens and democracy that the Fourth Estate has long
shouldered. Journalists who aspire to the watchdog role traditionally
protected by the First Amendment are increasingly tethered to platforms.
Platform values, including speed and scale, influence the editorial discretion
that is the animating feature of press freedom. Today, we have a Networked
Press.

Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 461 (2012); Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now,
77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 52 (2016).
33. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 32, at 434–35 (discussing the First Amendment’s role in
the internet era); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1602–03 (2018); Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment
Obsolete?,
KNIGHT
FIRST
AMENDMENT
INSTITUTE
(Sept.
1,
2017),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete.
34. See infra Section I.A.
35. See infra Section I.B.
36. See infra Section I.C.
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Part III will begin by confronting the limits of the First Amendment.
The state action doctrine prevents the First Amendment from truly protecting
watchdog journalism in a Networked Press environment. A disconnect exists
between the press that we have and the press that our Constitution is capable
of protecting. This disconnect should prompt us to examine whether our
current legal framework fosters and protects the type of journalism that
centuries of scholars, lawyers, and politicians have said is essential to
democracy. We have long relied on the market to produce such journalism.
Now, in an era of cheap information, the shortcomings of that approach are
clear. Part III will also consider the path forward. It will provide a menu of
extra-constitutional legal options aimed at fostering watchdog journalism in
the age of the Networked Press. They include options that would both loosen
the hold of platforms on journalists and empower journalists by making their
investigative reporting easier.
By definition, the Fourth Estate is not loyal to the occupant of any
government office, but it is devoted to upholding our form of government.
Watchdog journalism is a check on corruption and protection against
tyranny. 37 In contrast, the more diffuse Networked Press, with its web of
human and non-human actors, has no collective loyalty. By allowing the
Networked Press’s most powerful actors, technology platforms, to impose
their values on the press, we are at risk of outsourcing a key constitutional
function to Silicon Valley. 38 The First Amendment alone is unlikely to
resolve this problem. To protect the watchdog role in a Networked Press era,
we should look beyond it.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, THE PRESS, AND THE FOURTH ESTATE
Cognitive linguists believe that a function of metaphor is to make the
abstract more concrete. 39 Describing life as a “journey,” for example, gives
some shape to an otherwise difficult-to-define concept. 40 The “Fourth
Estate” does the same for the press. The words themselves conjure up a literal
place—a formidable manor building with grounds, separated from three other
similar estates. This image captures qualities that have been definitional for
the American press; it is an independent institution that serves as an overseer
of and check on the other estates.

37. See BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM: WHAT
NEWSPEOPLE SHOULD KNOW AND THE PUBLIC SHOULD EXPECT 174 (3d ed. 2014).
38. See Bell & Owen, supra note 17 (quoting David Skok, a digital media executive who
worked for The Boston Globe and Toronto Star, as saying, “We are outsourcing our core
competency to third parties. We simply don’t have a choice”).
39. See ZOLTÁN KÖVECSES, METAPHOR: A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION 4 (2002).
40. See id.
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The Fourth Estate metaphor has served admirably for centuries. Both
when the First Amendment was ratified and when the Supreme Court
interpreted the First Amendment in cases involving the press, the conception
of a “free press” under American law has been one that aligns with the Fourth
Estate metaphor and its inherent qualities. This Section begins by describing
how the Framers viewed the press as having the qualities of a Fourth Estate
and consequently, how the metaphor was baked into the First Amendment.
It then describes the way in which, when the Supreme Court turned in earnest
to interpreting the First Amendment in the second half of the twentieth
century, it fleshed out the Fourth Estate metaphor. The Court’s effort was
both descriptive and normative. It reflected a press that actually existed, a
press that checked government. Likewise, the Court enshrined its vision of
the Fourth Estate into constitutional law.
A. The Framers and the Fourth Estate
Somewhat ironically for a metaphor about the origins of journalism, the
“when,” “where,” and “who” regarding the first use of the term “Fourth
Estate” cannot be confirmed. 41 An often-told version of the story is this: It
was 1787 in London, and British parliamentarian Edmund Burke was
speaking of the rights of reporters to listen in on the business of government
when he said: “there were three estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’
Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more important far than they all.” 42
The three estates Burke referred to were the clergy, the nobility, and the
commoners. 43 When the metaphor gained currency here in the United States,
the estates were Americanized and became the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government. 44
If we believe this origin story, the timing of Burke’s speech—two years
before the drafting of the First Amendment—makes it possible that the
Framers were familiar with the metaphor. 45 But regardless of whether the
Framers knew or used the metaphor, evidence exists that they understood the
41. See Gregory Shaya, The Myth of the Fourth Estate, LAPHAM’S Q. (Apr. 3, 2012),
https://www.laphamsquarterly.org/roundtable/myth-fourth-estate (noting that the phrase is
“mistakenly” attributed to Edmund Burke).
42. See id.; Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975). But see
JULIANNE SCHULTZ, REVIVING THE FOURTH ESTATE 49 (1998) (“The Oxford English Dictionary
notes for instance that when Thomas Carlyle . . . attributed the term to Edmund Burke, he observed
that Burke had used it as a derogatory reference to the self-importance of parliamentary reporters in
1787.”).
43. See Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1366 n.18 (2016); Zygmunt J.B.
Plater, A Jeffersonian Challenge from Tennessee: The Notorious Case of the Endangered “Snail
Darter” Versus TVA’s Tellico Dam—and Where Was the Fourth Estate, the Press?, 80 TENN. L.
REV. 501, 501 n.1 (2013).
44. See Stewart, supra note 42, at 634.
45. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 132.
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press as having the qualities of a Fourth Estate. 46 The press was an
institution. That institution was independent, and it served as a check on
government.
Asserting that the Framers viewed the press as an institution is
admittedly controversial. Scholars and Supreme Court Justices have heatedly
debated whether the Press Clause protects the press as an institution or merely
as a technology. 47 In a 1974 speech, Justice Potter Stewart argued that the
First Amendment’s Press Clause was a structural provision designed to
protect an institutional press. 48 He wrote that the Framers’ goal in including
the Press Clause in the First Amendment was “to create a fourth institution
outside the Government as an additional check on the three official
branches.” 49 He added, “The relevant metaphor, I think, is the metaphor of
the Fourth Estate.” 50 This view never commanded a majority of the Court,
however. Instead, First Amendment doctrine is that the Press Clause does
not confer special protections on the press. 51
Nearly four decades later, in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 52 this debate between press-as-technology versus press-asinstitution resurfaced. 53 Justice Scalia wrote in a concurrence that it was
“passing strange” to think of the press as an entity worthy of First
Amendment protection. 54 In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens countered
that the Press Clause suggests the press “might be able to claim special First

46. See LEVY, supra note 10, at xii, 273 (noting that at about the time of the framing, “[a] free
press meant the press as the Fourth Estate, or, rather, in the American scheme, an informal or
extraconstitutional fourth branch that functioned as part of the intricate system of checks and
balances that exposed public mismanagement and kept power fragmented, manageable, and
accountable”); Bernard Schwartz, Death TV? Is There a Press Right of Access to News That Allows
Television of Executions?, 30 TULSA L.J. 305, 350 (1994) (arguing that “influenced by Burke or
not, Americans did develop a concept of the press as a Fourth Estate institution by the time the Bill
of Rights was ratified”).
47. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 390 n.6 (2010) (Scalia,
J., concurring); id. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Volokh, supra
note 32, at 461–63; West, supra note 32, at 49.
48. See Stewart, supra note 42, at 634.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 353 (“There is no doubt that the Supreme Court
jurisprudence . . . has rejected the Fourth Estate concept of the press with additional institutional
rights and has instead accepted the Warren notion of the press vested only with the same rights as
members of the public.”).
52. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
53. Id. at 390 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
54. Id. at 390–91 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Amendment status.” 55 The case set off a new round of scholarly sparring
over the Press Clause’s meaning. 56
Emerging from the debate is a convincing argument that the Framers
saw the press as both technology and institution. First Amendment and
media law scholar Professor Sonja R. West has argued that a consensus
probably did not exist among the Framers on the precise meaning of the press
and that they likely understood the press to have “multiple ‘original’
meanings.” 57 She has written that the press “was a technology that, in their
experience, was inextricably linked with a group of specialists who were
discharging a particular set of functions by informing the citizenry about
matters of public concern and checking government abuses.” 58 West
examined the “lived experience” of the framing generation and demonstrated
that “[b]oth in practice and in reputation, the printing press overlapped
meaningfully with the growing concept of the ‘press’ as a community of
newspapers and the men who made them.” 59 Thus, evidence exists
suggesting that the Framers understood the press, at least in part, to be a group
of specialized actors with a common goal and the Press Clause as a structural
provision to protect the institution of the press. 60
To be fair, scholars and the Court do not utilize an agreed upon
definition of institution. Professor Eugene Volokh, in his work on the Press
Clause, wrote “press as institution” could be substituted with press as
“industry,” “trade,” or “occupation.” 61 Professor West used “community,”
“specialized craft,” and an “institutionalized, professionalized endeavor.” 62
Although varied, these labels are consistent with the broad conception of
institution I adopt—an organization of individuals bound by common norms,
goals, and purpose. 63 Under this definition, the Framers viewed the press as
an institution.

55. Id. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 32, at 461–63; West, supra note 32, at 49.
57. West, supra note 32, at 55, 61.
58. Id. at 105.
59. Id. at 52, 82. This view was shared by Professor Randall P. Bezanson who wrote, “The
press is an institutional speaker. This conception of the press was understood in a rough and
structural way at the time the First Amendment was ratified, for the press was even then seen as
playing a systematic role in democratic society.” Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of
Editorial Judgment, 78 NEB. L. REV. 754, 757 (1999) (footnote omitted).
60. See West, supra note 32, at 89.
61. See Volokh, supra note 32, at 461, 461 n.2.
62. See West, supra note 32, at 82, 95.
63. My definition is drawn from First Amendment scholar Professor Paul Horwitz who
describes an institution as an organization of individuals “bound together by [a] common purpose.”
PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 11 (2013) (quoting Douglass C. North,
Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 361 (1994)). This organization is
one of shared “formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms
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As a key feature of its institutional nature, the Framers also sought to
ensure the press’s independence. The text of the First Amendment announces
the importance of press autonomy from government. 64 At the heart of this
freedom is the press’s ability to exercise editorial discretion. 65 Printers were
exercising this discretion at the time of the First Amendment’s ratification.
As First Amendment scholar Professor Randall P. Bezanson wrote, printers
in eighteenth and nineteenth-century England were “selecting material to be
published for [a] rapidly increasing audience” and in doing so were
exercising “independence from government.” 66 When the technology of
printing and mass production was brought to America during the same era,
“the idea of ‘news’ and editorial judgment was refined and extended, but not
fundamentally altered.” 67
As an independent institution, the Framers envisioned a key role of the
press as being a check on government. About this, there is little dispute.
“Indeed, if one had to identify the single value that was uppermost in the
minds of the persons who drafted and ratified the First Amendment, this
checking value would be the most likely candidate,” wrote First Amendment
scholar Professor Vincent Blasi. 68 The Framers understood well the threat
posed by government tyranny and the importance of having means to oppose
it. The trial and acquittal of printer John Peter Zenger in 1735 for seditious
libel was still in relatively recent memory. 69 More proximate to the framing
era, in 1774 the Continental Congress had made clear the importance of the
checking function. In outlining the fundamental rights colonists sought, it
emphasized that by a free press “oppressive officers are shamed or
intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.” 70
And shortly after the First Amendment was ratified, its drafter, James
Madison, argued that while press freedom in England may have been limited
due to the belief that legislators there sufficiently checked the executive, in

of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics.”
Id. (quoting North, supra at 360).
64. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press . . . .”).
65. See Randall P. Bezanson, The Atomization of the Newspaper: Technology, Economics and
the Coming Transformation of Editorial Judgments About News, 3 COMM. L. POL’Y 175, 176
(1998).
66. Id. at 183.
67. Id.
68. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 521, 527 (1977); see West, supra note 32, at 70.
69. See Blasi, supra note 68, at 534–35.
70. Id. at 535 (quoting 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 221 (Bernard
Schwartz, ed., Chelsea House Publishers 1971)).
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the United States the situation was different.71 More freedom was required
here, he argued, because officials were not “infallible” or “omnipotent.” 72
Thus, even at the time of the framing, the components of a Fourth Estate
were in place. A collective of printers exercising editorial discretion was
serving as a check on the nation’s fledgling government. The Fourth Estate
was taking shape, and the First Amendment promised to protect it from
government interference.
B. The Supreme Court and the Fourth Estate
The Supreme Court cemented the conception of the press as a Fourth
Estate in a series of decisions in the mid-twentieth century. Although in its
first 130-or-so years, the First Amendment lay dormant, the Supreme Court
began deciding First Amendment cases in earnest at the close of World
War I. 73 And in the next four decades, the Court issued a series of opinions
that constitute a chunk of any media law casebook. 74 In those opinions, the
Court recognized and named the inherent qualities of a Fourth Estate. It
characterized the press as an institution. It also confirmed this institution was
endowed with independence in the form of editorial discretion. Moreover, it
indicated that a key press function is government watchdog.
“[T]he institutional press,” wrote Justice Brennan in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 75 “serves as the ‘agent’ of interested citizens.” 76
This 1980 concurrence capped off an era in which numerous opinions
describe the press as an institution. For example, First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti 77 calls the press an “institution” with a “constitutionally
recognized role of . . . informing and educating the public, offering criticism,
and providing a forum for discussion and debate.” 78 Likewise, in Mills v.
Alabama, 79 the Court refers to the press as “one of the very agencies” the

71. Id. at 535–36.
72. Id. at 536 (quoting THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
JAMES MADISON 331 (Marvin Meyers, ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1973)); James Madison, Report on
the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 570 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1941).
73. The Supreme Court said of its own First Amendment jurisprudence that “[n]o important
case involving free speech was decided” until the close of World War I. Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951); see also Anderson, supra note 32, at 448 n.94; Wu, supra note 33 (“The
First Amendment was a dead letter for much of American history.”).
74. See Anderson, supra note 32, at 448.
75. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
76. Id. at 586, n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
78. Id. at 781.
79. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
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Framers “thoughtfully and deliberately selected to improve our society and
keep it free.” 80
In conceiving of the press as an institution, these decisions celebrated
the press’s independence. They described the editorial discretion that the
press exercised as almost sacrosanct. For example, in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 81 a case striking down a state law giving a political
candidate the right to reply to a negative newspaper editorial, the Court
concluded the government had no business interfering with the editorial
process. 82 “The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of
public issues and public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the
exercise of editorial control and judgment[,]” the Court wrote. 83 “It has yet
to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can
be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as
they have evolved to this time.” 84 Similarly, in Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 85 the Court insisted on the
right of journalists to exercise discretion in determining what qualified as
news. 86 The Court rejected the lower court’s view that “every potential
speaker is ‘the best judge’ of what the listening public ought to hear.” 87 It
reasoned that “[a]ll journalistic tradition and experience is to the contrary.” 88
Thus, even though the Supreme Court’s doctrine is that the First
Amendment confers no unique protections on the press as an institution and
that members of the press have no greater protections than any other
speaker, 89 in truth, the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is more

80. Id. at 219. In referring to the institutional press, the Justices were not always doing so
favorably. In his dissent in New York Times Co. v. United States, faulting the government for
publishing secret documents, Justice Burger wrote: “To me it is hardly believable that a newspaper
long regarded as a great institution in American life would fail to perform one of the basic and
simple duties of every citizen with respect to the discovery or possession of stolen property or secret
government documents.” 403 U.S. 713, 751 (1971) (Burger, J., dissenting).
81. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
82. Id. at 258.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
86. See id. at 124–25.
87. Id. at 124.
88. Id.
89. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (“Freedom of the press is a
‘fundamental personal right’ which ‘is not confined to newspapers and periodicals.’” (quoting
Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450, 452 (1938))). Consistent with this view of the doctrine, First
Amendment scholar Professor Frederick Schauer has argued that the Court has made too little of
institutional difference, including that of the press. See Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional
First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1256–60 (2005). According to Professor Schauer,
differentiating between institutions should “be part of the large arsenal of appropriate First
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complex. It seems built on acceptance of, and even reliance on, the
institutional nature of the press. Take Tornillo and the Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. cases. In both, the Court defers not to individual
journalists but to “editorial control and judgment” and to “journalistic
tradition.” 90 In doing so the Court reveals its comfort in deferring to an entity
that is, like the Court itself, bound by norms and rules. 91 The Court seems to
defer to an institution rather than any individual.
Finally, in addition to recognizing the institutional and independent
nature of the press, the Court repeatedly discussed the press’s roles and
duties. Chief among these was serving as a watchdog. Take, for example,
New York Times Co. v. United States, 92 a case about one of the press’s most
legendary acts of checking the government—its publishing of the “Pentagon
Papers,” secret government documents about the country’s involvement in
the Vietnam War. 93 In a concurring opinion, Justice Black wrote that by the
First Amendment, “[t]he press was protected so that it could bare the secrets
of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can
effectively expose deception in government.” 94 The concurrence went so far
as to say that a free press not only could be a watchdog but had an affirmative
obligation to do so. 95 It stated that “paramount among the responsibilities of
a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving
the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and
foreign shot and shell.” 96
Other cases from the same era likewise lionize the press’s role as a
“handmaiden of effective judicial administration” through “guard[ing]
Amendment techniques.” Id. at 1279. As described, however, I believe that the Court has already
recognized and relied upon institutional difference. Of course, it could do so more clearly and
regularly, as Professor Schauer proposes.
90. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 412 U.S. at 124.
91. And notably, even in one of the very cases in which the Court indicated the press cannot
lay claim to any special protections, the Court’s opinion effectively gave the press just that. In
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., the Court wrote that the news media did not have any “special privilege
of access to information.” 438 U.S. 1, 10 (1978). Yet, in a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart
wrote that although “[t]he Constitution does no more than assure the public and the press equal
access” to information, that “equal access” includes accounting for “the practical distinctions
between the press and the general public” and the press’s mission to inform. Id. at 16–17 (Stewart,
J., concurring). Thus, Justice Stewart’s opinion, which was effectively the controlling one in the 43 decision, agreed with a district court finding that the press was entitled to access to a jail “on a
more flexible and frequent basis” than members of the public. Id. at 18.
92. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
93. See id. at 717; New York Times Company v. United States, OYEZ,
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/1873 (noting the case “became known as the ‘Pentagon Papers
Case’”).
94. 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
95. See id.
96. Id.

544

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:529

against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.” 97 More
broadly, the Court indicated that the press acted as “a powerful and
constructive force, contributing to remedial action in the conduct of public
business” 98 and that “the press serves and was designed to serve as a powerful
antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a
constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people
responsible to all the people whom they were elected to serve.” 99
Thus, even though the Court has largely sidestepped the Press Clause
and stated that the rights of journalists are no greater than other speakers, it
has meanwhile repeatedly recognized and relied upon the institutional nature
of the press. It has characterized the press as independent and cohesive and
signaled that it is worthy of significant deference. It has lauded its watchdog
role and even indicated the press’s responsibility to undertake it. In doing so,
although the Supreme Court has not used the words “Fourth Estate,” it has
fortified the metaphor.
C. The Fourth Estate in Action
The timing of the Supreme Court’s opinions celebrating the press is no
coincidence. The 1960s were the press’s period of “high modernism.” 100 In
writing about an institutional press wielding its editorial discretion to serve
as a watchdog over government, the Court was not merely being normative
but descriptive as well. It was depicting a press that in many ways already
existed. 101
A far cry from the colonial-era newspapers that journalist and historian
Professor Jill Lepore called “a ragged fleet of dung barges,” by the World
War II era, the press had actually developed into a robust institution. 102 It
exhibited shared norms and goals that had been in development for several
decades. For one, it had professional associations, awards, and training
opportunities. The Society of Professional Journalists was founded in
1909, 103 and the American Society of Newspaper Editors (now the American
97. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966); see Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 559–60 (1976).
98. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978).
99. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966).
100. MICHAEL SCHUDSON, WHY DEMOCRACIES NEED AN UNLOVABLE PRESS 35 (2008).
101. See HORWITZ, supra note 63, at 16 (“Law regulates our culture, but it is also determined
by our culture.”).
102. See Jill Lepore, The Day the Newspaper Died, NEW YORKER (Jan. 19, 2009),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/01/26/back-issues; see also West, supra note 30, at 88
(quoting Lepore, supra).
103. See Join SPJ, SOC’Y PROF. JOURNALISTS, https://www.spj.org/join.asp (last visited Oct.
21, 2019).
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Society of News Editors) followed thirteen years later. 104 Although
Columbia University had in 1892 turned down an offer by Joseph Pulitzer to
establish a school of journalism, by 1912, university leadership changed its
mind. 105 That year, journalism classes began for seventy-nine undergraduate
and graduate students. 106 In 1917, the University bestowed the first round of
Pulitzer Prizes, which Joseph Pulitzer said in his will were to elevate a “noble
profession.” 107
Along with graduate programs, professional organizations, and prizes
came increased attention to institutional standards and norms. News became
less commentary and more “scientized” and “fact-centered.” 108 Objectivity
became “a kind of industrial discipline.” 109 News “was grounded in ‘a faith
in “facts,” a distrust of “values,” and a commitment to their segregation.’” 110
In 1923, at its opening convention, the American Society of Newspaper
Editors adopted the “Canons of Journalism,” which included impartiality,
truthfulness, and accuracy. 111 Likely in service of objectivity, it was by this
time that interviewing became a routine aspect of journalism. 112
The press’s increasing focus on objectivity was, in part, a means of
asserting its freedom from forces that might tether it. It was a response to
criticism that the press had been a conduit for propaganda during World War
I. 113 It was also an attempt to distinguish journalism from the burgeoning
fields of public relations and advertising. 114 Thus, the press’s cohesiveness
104. See About Us, AM. SOC’Y NEWSPAPER EDITORS, http://asne.org/about-us (last visited Oct.
22, 2019).
105. See Michael Lewis, J-School Confidential–Columbia: The Inside Story, NEW REPUBLIC
(Apr. 18, 1993), https://newrepublic.com/article/72485/j-school-confidential; Bridget O’Brian,
Pulitzer Prizes Celebrate 100 Noteworthy Years, COLUM. NEWS (Feb. 16, 2016),
https://news.columbia.edu/news/pulitzer-prizes-celebrate-100-newsworthy-years.
106. See Our History, COLUM. JOURNALISM SCH., https://journalism.columbia.edu/columbiajournalism-school (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
107. See Seymour Topping, History of the Pulitzer Prizes, PULITZER PRIZES,
http://www.pulitzer.org/page/history-pulitzer-prizes (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
108. See ANANNY, supra note 17, at 68 (quoting Daniel C. Hallin, Critical Theory and Public
Life, in THE AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA: A CRITICAL THEORY PERSPECTIVE 130 (J. Forester ed.,
1985)).
109. MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF NEWS 75 (2011).
110. See ANANNY, supra note 17, at 68 (quoting MICHAEL SCHUDSON, DISCOVERING THE
NEWS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS 6 (1978)).
111. See SCHUDSON, supra note 109, at 75; History, AM. SOC’Y NEWSPAPER EDITORS,
https://www.asne.org/asne-history (last visited Oct. 22, 2019).
112. See SCHUDSON, supra note 109, at 74.
113. See ANANNY, supra note 17, at 75. As media sociologist Michael Schudson wrote, “For
journalism, habitual deference to government officials, especially in foreign policy, came to be seen
not as professionalism but as occupationally induced laziness, naïveté, or worse.” SCHUDSON,
supra note 109, at 80. Journalists began emphasizing their role as “activist, reformer, and exposer.”
KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 37, at 169.
114. See ANANNY, supra note 17, at 71; SCHUDSON, supra note 109, at 76.
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as an institution coincided with its increasing independence from other major
forces that had traditionally impeded its freedom and independent exercise
of editorial discretion.
As the institutional press developed, it played its constitutionally
prescribed watchdog role in ways that have become fodder for Hollywood
blockbusters. 115 In 1971, The New York Times and other newspapers
published the Pentagon Papers. 116 The next year, The Washington Post
would play a key role in revealing the details of the Watergate scandal that
brought down a president and numerous other officials. 117 Around this time
as well, CBS launched 60 Minutes, an investigative news show so successful
that it is still produced today. 118
The press’s watchdog role during this time period also extended beyond
what it published. The press served as an “instigator and enforcer” in
legislatures and courts. 119 Cases like New York Times Co. v. United States
(allowing newspapers to publish the Pentagon Papers), Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 120 (granting access to courtrooms during
criminal trials) and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart 121 (invalidating a
bar on the press publishing accounts of confessions or admissions in a
criminal trial) all involved the press flexing its muscle in the name of greater
First Amendment freedoms. 122 “Without newspapers and newspaper
organizations at the helm—instigating, enforcing, coordinating, and
financing legal change, much, if not most, of the nation’s important opengovernment law from the last generation simply would not have come to
pass,” according to First Amendment and media law scholar Professor
RonNell Andersen Jones. 123 This includes the Freedom of Information
Act, 124 which was drafted by a former journalist and passed because of the
work of a wide range of journalism organizations. 125

115. See, e.g., ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Wildwood Enterprises 1976); THE POST (Twentieth
Century Fox et al. 2017).
116. See KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 37, at 177; SCHUDSON, supra note 109, at 81.
117. See SCHUDSON, supra note 109, at 82.
118. See KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 37, at 170.
119. See Jones, supra note 16, at 559.
120. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
121. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
122. See 403 U.S. 714, 714 (1971) (per curiam); 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980); 427 U.S. 539, 570,
584 (1976).
123. Jones, supra note 16, at 570.
124. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
125. To be sure, the press plays numerous societal roles that may not all be encompassed under
the watchdog umbrella. For example, Professor Michael Schudson described the six functions of
journalism in democratic societies as: information, investigation, analysis, social empathy, public
forum, and mobilization. SCHUDSON, supra note 100, at 12. Acting as a watchdog may overlap
with one or more of these roles at any given time, but it does not necessarily do so.
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To be fair, this golden age of journalism was not without tarnish. The
press could be biased. It could still be a mouthpiece for government and
private interests. 126 It could be apathetic and even hostile to women and
people of color both in its ranks and in its audience.127 Even so, if we look
at the attributes that made the press a Fourth Estate—institutional cohesion,
the ability to exercise independence through editorial discretion, and service
as a watchdog—the press was at a relative apex. It was profiting
handsomely. 128 It controlled its distribution networks. 129 And, although
composed of many news organizations, those organizations that made up the
Fourth Estate only had to worry about competing with one other. News
executives likely would not have imagined a day in which they would be
beholden to a handful of platforms, just one of which, Alphabet, Inc., the
parent company of Google, has annual revenue nearly six times that of the
entire newspaper industry. 130

126. See Amanda Bennett, Media Bias is Nothing New, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2015/12/22/media-bias-is-nothing-new/
(“[Debra van Tuyll’s] theory is that we never actually lost the partisan ideal . . . The partisan press
is the normal state of journalism.”).
127. Diversity remains a significant problem in the institutional press today. See Elizabeth
Grieco, Newsroom Employees Are Less Diverse Than U.S. Workers Overall, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov.
2, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/02/newsroom-employees-are-lessdiverse-than-u-s-workers-overall/ (reporting that seventy-seven percent of newsroom employees
are “non-Hispanic whites” as compared with sixty-five percent across the workforce). Among the
reasons diversity is important, is that non-diverse newsrooms can misread, misunderstand, fail to
notice things, and get things wrong. See Jelani Cobb, When Newsrooms Are Dominated by White
People,
They
Miss
Crucial
Facts,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
5,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2018/nov/05/newsroom-diversity-media-racejournalism.
128. Paul Starr, Goodbye to the Age of Newspapers, in WILL THE LAST REPORTER PLEASE
TURN OUT THE LIGHTS: THE COLLAPSE OF JOURNALISM AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO FIX IT 31
(Robert W. McChesney & Victor Pickard eds., 2011) (noting that the “lush profits that enabled [the
press] to produce news as a public good are disappearing”).
129. Bell & Owen, supra note 17 (describing how news organizations have relinquished their
distribution role to technology platforms).
130. Combined circulation and subscription revenue for newspapers in 2018 was an estimated
$25.3 billion.
See Newspapers Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (July 9, 2019),
https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/ (adding together estimated subscription and
advertising revenue in the “Data” tab of “Estimated advertising and circulation revenue of the
newspaper industry”). In contrast, Alphabet, Inc.’s revenue was $136.8 billion in 2018. See
Alphabet Announces Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2018 Results (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://abc.xyz/investor/static/pdf/2018Q4_alphabet_earnings_release.pdf. Facebook’s revenue for
2018 was approximately $55.8 billion. See Press Release, Facebook, Inc., Facebook Reports Fourth
Quarter and Full Year 2018 Results (Jan. 30, 2019), https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/pressrelease-details/2019/Facebook-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2018-Results/default.aspx.
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II. THE NETWORKED PRESS: DEFINING FEATURES AND THE CHALLENGE TO
WATCHDOG REPORTING
In May of 2018, Showtime premiered a docu-series by Oscar-nominated
filmmaker Liz Garbus entitled The Fourth Estate. 131 A teaser for the series
says it “intimately chronicles the tenacious men and women in the trenches
who are fighting for the freedom of the press and America’s right to
know.” 132 But despite its title and this description, the series is not primarily
about “the press.” Rather, its focus is a single newspaper: The New York
Times. It follows Times journalists as they cover the first year of the Trump
Administration.
The title of the series is evidence that the Fourth Estate metaphor still
has cultural heft. And yet, its subject demonstrates how narrow its scope has
become. The Fourth Estate has not disappeared, but it has both shrunk and
also been subsumed into a broader media ecosystem—one that includes
players far more powerful than the Times. Although they deny being media
companies, platforms like Google, Facebook, and Twitter are exercising
traditional press functions, including editorial discretion. 133 And what media
scholar Jay Rosen called “the people formerly known as the audience” are
also playing journalistic functions by creating, curating, and sharing news,
not simply consuming it. 134 That these entities might not consider themselves
members of the press—or may even actively distance themselves from the
label—does not negate their role.
Platforms are goliaths in the news ecosystem because they are often
where we go to find news. And they are a particular threat to news because
platforms are also where we go to find so many other types of information.
News is just one type of content that platforms monetize. Platforms are not

131. Greg Evans, Liz Garbus’ New York Times Documentary Gets May Premiere on
Showtime—TCA, DEADLINE (Jan. 6, 2018), http://deadline.com/2018/01/liz-garbus-showtime-newyork-times-documentary-may-premiere-tca-1202237019/; Matt Grobar, ‘The Fourth Estate’
Director Liz Garbus on the Plight of Journalists in the Trump Era, DEADLINE (May 14, 2018, 12:18
PM),
http://deadline.com/2018/05/the-fourth-estate-donald-trump-liz-garbus-showtime-videointerview-1202371099/.
132. Evans, supra note 131.
133. See Margaret Sullivan, Mark Zuckerberg Is a Horror Show. But There’s a Glimmer of
Truth Hidden in His Latest Blunder, WASH. POST (July 22, 2018, 4:00 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/mark-zuckerberg-is-a-horror-show-but-theres-aglimmer-of-truth-hidden-in-his-latest-blunder/2018/07/20/023c46da-8c1b-11e8-8aea86e88ae760d8_story.html?utm_term=.2333a9fe645f (quoting renowned First Amendment lawyer
Floyd Abrams on Facebook’s press-like function saying, “They say ‘we don’t do editing’ but they
do make choices”).
134. See Jay Rosen, The People Formerly Known as the Audience, HUFFPOST: THE BLOG (June
30, 2006, 10:05 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jay-rosen/the-people-formerlyknown_1_b_24113.html (last updated May 25, 2011); see also KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note
37, at 25.
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concerned with news as much as they are with whether news is content that
captures attention.
Each week, 600 million people see a news story on Facebook. 135
Between February 2018 and February 2019, about fifty percent of referral
traffic to publisher sites came from Google and twenty-five percent was from
Facebook. 136 Consumers also find news on other platforms including
YouTube (owned by Google), Twitter, Reddit, Instagram (which is owned
by Facebook), and Snapchat. 137 In other words, a significant percentage of
news sites’ readership is coming to them through a search engine or social
media. “[N]ews spaces are no longer owned by newsmakers,” Emily Bell,
the director of the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at Columbia University,
said. 138 Rather, platforms are now playing a gatekeeping function once
exercised by the press.
This gatekeeping role has earned platforms vast wealth. Google and
Facebook control about seventy-three percent of digital advertising revenue
in the United States. 139 While newspapers have hung on to some of this
revenue, most has escaped their white-knuckle grasp. In the last decade,
advertiser spending on newspapers plunged by almost seventy-five
percent. 140 Desperate to recoup some of that loss, many publications have
agreed to share their journalism with certain platforms and, in return, receive
some portion of advertising revenue. 141 These arrangements have tended to
disadvantage news organizations. A 2017 report by the World Association
of Newspapers and News Publishers “conclude[d] that. . . ‘revenue shared by

135. Julia Greenberg, Facebook Has Seized the Media, and That’s Bad News for Everyone but
Facebook, WIRED (Apr. 13, 2016, 3:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/facebook-seizedmedia-thats-bad-news-everyone-facebook/. About two-thirds of American adults use Facebook,
and nearly half of them get news from the site. John Gramlich, 10 Facts About Americans and
Facebook, PEW RES. CTR. (May 16, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/05/16/facts-about-americans-and-facebook/.
136. See Explore Traffic Source Trends for Digital Publishers, PARSE.LY (Dec. 14, 2016).
https://www.parse.ly/resources/data-studies/referrer-dashboard/.
137. See Brown et al., supra note 18.
138. See Elise Hu, Silicon Valley’s Power over the Free Press: Why it Matters, NPR (Nov. 24,
2014, 3:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/11/24/366327398/siliconvalleys-power-over-the-free-press-why-it-matters.
139. Tiku, supra note 12.
140. FOER, supra note 25, at 211.
141. One example is the May 2015 announcement by Facebook that it had entered into
agreements with nine publishers that would provide Facebook content for its Instant Articles
product. See MARTIN MOORE, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF MEDIA, COMMC’N, AND POWER, TECH
GIANTS AND CIVIC POWER 31 (2016), https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/assets/cmcp/techgiants-and-civic-power.pdf. In describing this development, media scholar Martin Moore says that
the publishers entered into these agreements “willingly.” See id. Yet, this is not an entirely fair
characterization. Having had their revenue streams gutted, publishers were left with few options.
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the leading platforms is too low to fully fund editorial operations,’ even for
the largest [news] organizations.” 142
Although some news organizations are raising significant revenue
through online subscriptions, these successes are still limited. 143 Erosion of
the press’s business model is widespread. News bureaus are shuttering.
Journalists are being laid off. Entire newspapers are folding. 144 Digitalnative news sites are not immune. In January 2019, BuzzFeed and the media
division of Verizon, which owns Yahoo, HuffPost, and TechCrunch, laid off
hundreds of workers. 145 The press’s contraction is particularly acute in
smaller markets. New York Times Executive Editor Dean Baquet said, “[t]he
biggest crisis in journalism is not Donald Trump’s attacks on The
Washington Post and The New York Times.” 146 Rather, it is “the decline of
local newspapers.” 147 News deserts are proliferating. 148 To the extent a
142. Ricardo Bilton, Are Publishers Making Money on Facebook? “Not Really,” a New Report
Finds, NIEMANLAB (Sept. 14, 2017), http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/09/are-publishers-makingmoney-on-facebook-not-really-a-new-report-finds/.
143. See Joshua Benton, So Some People Will Pay for a Subscription to a News Site. How About
Two? Three?, NIEMANLAB (Nov. 13, 2018, 1:06 PM), http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/11/sosome-people-will-pay-for-a-subscription-to-a-news-site-how-about-twothree/?utm_source=Daily+Lab+email+list&utm_campaign=4f7c334fd5dailylabemail3&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d68264fd5e-4f7c334fd5-396214909
(indicating that subscriptions are “at the center of media company plans for 2019 and beyond” but
that “[t]he data thus far isn’t super encouraging”).
144. See Daniel Funke, What’s Behind the Recent Media Bloodbath? The Dominance of Google
and Facebook, POYNTER (June 14, 2017), https://www.poynter.org/news/whats-behind-recentmedia-bloodbath-dominance-google-and-facebook (quoting Jason Kint, CEO of an advertising
trade organization saying, “[t]here is a clear correlation between layoffs and buyouts with the growth
in market share for the duopoly—Google and Facebook”). In fact, New York Times CEO Mark
Thompson forecasted benefits for his company in the next five years because so many other news
entities are going out of business. See Ken Doctor, Newsonomics: The New York Times’ Mark
Thompson on Regulating Facebook, Global Ambition, and When to Stop the Presses (Forever),
NIEMANLAB (Nov. 13, 2017, 11:24 AM), http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/11/newsonomics-thenew-york-times-mark-thompson-on-regulating-facebook-global-ambition-and-when-to-stop-thepresses-forever/.
145. Tom Kludt, Layoffs Underway at HuffPost a Day After Parent Company Verizon
BUSINESS
(Jan.
24,
2019,
12:50
PM),
Announced
Cuts,
CNN
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/24/media/huffpostlayoffs/index.html?utm_source=Daily+Lab+email+list&utm_campaign=fe3b715fc1dailylabemail3&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d68264fd5e-fe3b715fc1-396022525.
146. Jackie Wattles, New York Times Top Editor on Journalism’s “Biggest Crisis,” CNN
RELIABLE SOURCES (Apr. 8, 2018, 3:22 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/04/08/media/deanbaquet-new-york-times/index.html.
147. Id.
148. See Bucay et al., supra note 14. Relatedly, journalists are now more concentrated in a
handful of coastal cities. Whereas in 2004, one in eight news jobs was based in Washington, New
York, or Los Angeles, today it is one in five. See Helaine Olen, The Crisis in Journalism That’s
POST
(Apr.
9,
2018,
3:42
PM),
Helping
Trump,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2018/04/09/the-crisis-in-journalism-thatshelping-trump/?utm_term=.d3de140bb388.
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Fourth Estate still exists within the Networked Press, it is dominated by a
handful of powerful media like the Times and the Post that distract from the
rot that lies beneath them. 149
The Networked Press does not function in the same way that the Fourth
Estate, at its height, did. Its players do not abide by the same rules, hold the
same values, or aspire to the same goals. As a result, editorial discretion is
not operating in the same way. The decision of an engineer in Silicon Valley
may have far more impact on the news we consume than that of the editor in
chief of a big-city newspaper. And that engineer’s choices are influenced
more heavily by drawing users to a platform and keeping their attention than
providing them information that helps them to participate in democracy. A
casualty of this shift is the press’s watchdog role.
This Section describes the shift from the Fourth Estate to a Networked
Press. Section II.A. posits that the Networked Press is not an institution in
the same way as the Fourth Estate because platform norms and goals, which
differ from those of the press, figure so prominently. It sets out a taxonomy
of those norms and goals and contrasts them against those traditionally
exercised by the press, especially investigative reporters. These include:
commodification (versus duty), personalization (versus community),
agnosticism (versus commitment), speed (versus deliberation and process),
and scale (versus targeted impact). Section II.B goes on to describe how
platform norms and goals are starting to infiltrate those of the press,
influencing journalists’ exercise of editorial discretion and compromising
journalistic independence. It concludes that the Networked Press is impeding
the press’s watchdog role.
A. Competing Norms and the Decline of an Institutional Press
In the spring of 2016, Benjamin Fearnow was working as a contract
employee for Facebook. 150 The Columbia Journalism School graduate and
former producer at CBS News had been hired by a third party, and his
managers were reticent to permit him to list the Facebook position on his

149. By “rot,” I mean to invoke Professor Jack M. Balkin’s concept of “constitutional rot.” See
Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV. 147, 147 (2017).
Professor Balkin differentiates between the acute process of “constitutional crisis” and the
“degradation of constitutional norms that may operate over long periods of time” that he calls
“constitutional rot.” See id. at 147, 150–51. This slow, institutional degradation is similar to what
is occurring to the press.
150. See Mike Isaac, Facebook “Trending” List Skewed by Individual Judgment, Not
Institutional
Bias,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
20,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/21/technology/facebook-trending-list-skewed-by-individualjudgment-not-institutional-bias.html; Nicholas Thompson & Fred Vogelstein, Inside the Two Years
that Shook Facebook—and the World, WIRED, (Feb. 12, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/inside-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-2-years-of-hell/.
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LinkedIn profile. 151 His task, along with about two dozen others, was to work
in tandem with Facebook’s algorithms to decide which posts would be
featured on Facebook’s Trending News feature, a changing list of the most
popular stories on the platform. 152 If, for some reason, the algorithm didn’t
surface news that human editors like Fearnow thought was important, the
humans could “inject” this news. 153 Facebook hoped that the humans would
be so helpful in training the algorithms that the humans would eventually
make themselves unnecessary. 154
The plan was short-circuited, however, when the Trending News team
of editors became news themselves. A series of stories broken in May 2016
by technology publication Gizmodo revealed the existence of the human
editors at Facebook and that certain of them were suppressing conservative
views. 155 A public relations crisis ensued, and the backlash led Facebook
CEO Mark Zuckerberg to meet with conservative leaders. Zuckerberg posted
on Facebook about the meeting and included a photo with the words: “A
Platform for All Ideas.” 156 Several months later, Facebook fired the Trending
News team. 157

151. See Benjamin Fearnow, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/benjamin-fearnow3a096831/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2019); Nathan Bomey, How Facebook Fired Workers Who Blocked
“Fake News”—“After the Fact” Book Excerpt, USA TODAY (May 7, 2018, 9:24 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/05/06/after-fact-erosion-truth-donald-trumpbook/541341002/ (noting contractors had been “sworn to secrecy over the existence of their jobs”);
Isaac, supra note 150 (noting that “[m]anagers were ambivalent about allowing staff members to
identify themselves as curators or editors on their LinkedIn profiles . . . given concerns that
outsiders would notice the element of human judgment and ask questions about it”); Thompson &
Vogelstein, supra note 150.
152. See Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 150.
153. See id.
154. See id.; see also Sam Thielman, Facebook Fires Trending Team, and Algorithm Without
Humans
Goes
Crazy,
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
29,
2016,
12:48
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/29/facebook-fires-trending-topics-teamalgorithm (noting that “the trending module was meant to have ‘learned’ from the human editors’
curation decisions and was always meant to eventually reach full automation”).
155. See, e.g., Michael Nunez, Former Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed
Conservative News, GIZMODO (May 9, 2016, 9:10 AM), https://gizmodo.com/former-facebookworkers-we-routinely-suppressed-conser-1775461006; Michael Nunez, Want to Know What
Facebook Really Thinks of Journalists? Here’s What Happened When It Hired Some, GIZMODO
(May 3, 2016, 1:09 PM), https://gizmodo.com/want-to-know-what-facebook-really-thinks-ofjournalists-1773916117. Fearnow had been a roommate of the Gizmodo reporter who wrote the
stories and a source for stories about Facebook that had run earlier in 2016. See Thompson &
Vogelstein, supra note 150 (noting the source and roommate relationships). Once Facebook learned
of the leaks in April of 2016, it fired him. See id.; Isaac, supra note 150.
156. Mark
Zuckerberg,
FACEBOOK,
(May
18,
2016),
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10102840575485751&set=a.529237706231.2034669.
4&type=3&theater.
157. See Bomey, supra note 151.
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Reflecting on the experience, Fearnow (who had actually been fired in
April for leaking information to the Gizmodo reporter) expressed surprise at
the outcry over supposedly “liberal journalists” dictating stories, given that
the engineers training Facebook’s algorithm were truly the ones with the
power. 158 “The culture at Facebook is, the engineers there are like the
editors,” he said. 159 “They’re like God—because no one really knows
what . . . they do.” 160
The incident highlights the difficulty of labeling today’s press an
institution. Rather, platforms, software designers, engineers, algorithms,
consumers of news, journalists, and others all play press functions. 161 The
Fourth Estate still exists, but it could be described as a node in the Networked
Press—a web in which the biggest nodes are platforms. The norms of its
members vary wildly. Most significantly, the norms of platforms chafe
against those of the Fourth Estate. 162 Below is a taxonomy that details
platform norms and explains how they differ from those of the press. 163
1. Commodification vs. Duty
“If I ever say the word ‘user’ again, immediately charge me $140,” Jack
Dorsey, Twitter’s CEO, wrote in 2013. 164 “No one wants to be thought of as
a ‘user’ (or ‘consumer’ for that matter). I certainly don’t,” Dorsey said,
calling the word “derogatory.” 165 Dorsey then made a plea: “To everyone in
the technology industry: I encourage you to reconsider the word ‘user’ and

158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Mike Ananny, The Partnership Press: Lessons for Platform-Publisher Collaborations
as Facebook and News Outlets Team to Fight Information, TOW CTR. FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/partnership-press-facebook-news-outletsteam-fight-misinformation.php/#citations.
162. See KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 37, at xiii (“Much of the revenue surrounding
journalism now flows to companies such as Google that are engaged in its distribution but not its
creation and, thus, its values.”).
163. I chose to focus on the values of platforms both because of their outsized impact in the
Networked Press and because there are certain values platforms espouse that could be isolated and
described. I do not attempt to do the same for the audience as the group is too diverse with too
many motivations and values. I also do not attempt to define the values of algorithms because their
values are those that software engineers build into them. As Google’s vice president of news
Richard Gringas quipped, “As I often say, technology has value but it doesn’t have values. It’s what
we do with it.” David Skok, Google’s News Chief Richard Gringas: “We Need to Rethink
Journalism at Every Dimension,” NIEMANLAB (May 10, 2018, 10:11 AM),
http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/05/googles-news-chief-richard-gingras-we-need-to-rethinkjournalism-at-every-dimension/.
164. Jack Dorsey (jacks), Let’s reconsider our “users,” TUMBLR (2013),
http://jacks.tumblr.com/post/33785796042/lets-reconsider-our-users.
165. Id.
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what you call the people who love what you’ve created.” 166 It is not clear if
Dorsey ever needed to pay out; I have found no evidence of him saying “user”
publicly in the years since. Regardless, Dorsey definitively failed at
convincing Silicon Valley to give up the term.
His request was unlikely to be heeded. The term is hard to shake
because its negative connotations are apt. “User” accurately captures the
prototypical busy person reliant on the platform while not fully appreciating
what they are giving away. 167 Platforms commodify users. For platforms,
“users” are not really “customers” (a word Dorsey prefers). 168 Rather, as the
using public has begun to better understand, they are the commodity. 169
Although users do not hand over cash, platforms are not providing a free
service. Users pay with their personal information. 170 Platforms harvest vast
amounts of data from users that platforms then monetize. 171 The
commodification of users is the platform business model. 172
In contrast, a text widely read by journalism students counsels that
journalism’s “first loyalty is to citizens.” 173 This sentiment is echoed by
working journalists. For example, the editorial board of the Bangor (Maine)
Daily News wrote, “News organizations don’t serve governments. They
serve you, the public. They are the only way you know when your
government isn’t working as it should. They are the only independent way

166. Id.
167. It also captures the addictive nature of the technology given that “user” is also a word used
to describe someone addicted to drugs. Dorsey, too, recognized this connotation. See id.
168. See id.
169. Don Norman, the director of The Design Lab at the University of California, San Diego,
argues that “user” “is a way to degrade the people for whom we design, a way of labeling them as
objects.” Don Norman, Words Matter. Talk About People: Not Customers, Not Consumers, Not
JND.ORG,
(Nov.
17,
2008)
Users,
https://jnd.org/words_matter_talk_about_people_not_customers_not_consumers_not_users/;
About Don Norman, JND.ORG, https://www.jnd.org/about.html (July 24, 2018).
170. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 9 (2019) (“Digital
connection is now a means to others’ commercial ends.”).
171. See id. at 100 (describing how platforms like Google engage in surveillance capitalism that
renders human experience into “behavior” that is then commodified).
172. Id. at 498 (“[O]ur lives are scraped and sold to fund [surveillance capitalists’] freedom and
our subjugation, their knowledge and our ignorance about what they know.”) (Emphasis omitted);
Matthew Rosenberg & Gabriel J.X. Dance, “You Are the Product”: Targeted by Cambridge
TIMES
(Apr.
8,
2018),
Analytica
on
Facebook,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/08/us/facebook-users-data-harvested-cambridgeanalytica.html.
173. See ANANNY, supra note 17, at 186 (noting that “the very best and most self-reflective
journalists do not shy away from seeing their work as part of democratic culture” and that, in
contrast, “[a]s technology companies and social media platforms try to decide what exactly they are
and who their constituents are, they often only awkwardly and shallowly invoke democracy and
self-governance, preferring instead the safer terrain of users, customers, communities,
personalization, and optimization”); KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 37, at 9, 72.
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to know what elected officials are doing.” 174 Journalism—especially
watchdog journalism—is a public service. Providing information to citizenreaders that will allow them to be self-governing is the ultimate goal. 175 True,
like the “user” of a platform, the reader or viewer is commodified by the press
via advertising and subscriptions. In contrast to platforms, however, the press
reciprocates the reader or viewer’s investment with its own loyalty to that
reader or viewer as a citizen.
The press’s loyalty is sufficiently strong that it has been likened to a
legal duty. “Every CEO understands they have a fiduciary obligation to their
shareholders,” a former chairman of the International Herald Tribune, Peter
C. Goldmark, Jr., said. 176 “In terms of journalism, I put more faith in
corporate leadership that understands that they have an equally solemn
fiduciary responsibility arising from their ownership of a news
organization—that they hold a public trust.” 177 In fact, the Supreme Court
suggested such a duty exists when in Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart it wrote,
“The extraordinary protections afforded by the First Amendment carry with
them something in the nature of a fiduciary duty to exercise the protected
rights responsibly . . . .” 178
And so, while the press, like platforms, makes money from those who
read and watch its products, there is an important difference. The press views
itself as having an obligation to the communities and citizens it serves.179 It
sees itself as having a role fundamental to our democracy. In fact, a study by
psychologists at Stanford, Harvard, and University of Chicago found that
journalists are strikingly uniform in their understanding of their “public
174. The Media Is the Enemy Only If You Don’t Want to Know What Your Government Is Doing,
BANGOR
DAILY
NEWS
(Aug.
15,
2018,
12:04
PM),
http://bangordailynews.com/2018/08/15/opinion/editorials/media-is-the-enemy-only-if-you-dontwant-to-know-what-your-government-is-doing/; see also Journalists Aren’t the Enemy; We Are
You,
BOZEMAN
DAILY
CHRON.
(Aug.
15,
2018),
https://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/opinions/editorials/journalists-aren-t-the-enemy-we-areyou/article_bcebaadb-9616-584c-b721-e26d0b539a6c.html (noting, among the many roles this
newspaper and its journalists play that they are “the people’s eyes and ears at town, village, and
school board meetings” and they “hold people in power accountable for their actions”).
175. See Albuquerque Journal Editorial Board, Editorial: A Check on Power, ALBUQUERQUE
J. (Aug. 16, 2018, 12:02 AM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1209434/editorial-a-check-onpower.html (“The news media’s job is to hold a mirror up to the world, to tell the truth and to put
events into context, so that ‘we, the people’ can make wise and informed decisions. The job of the
media is to help the people hold their government accountable.”).
176. KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 37, at 88.
177. Id.
178. 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976). In this case, in which the Court had to balance fair trial rights
against the rights of the press to publish, the Court went on to say that this was “a duty widely
acknowledged but not always observed by editors and publishers.” Id.
179. See James T. Hamilton, What’s the Incentive to Save Journalism?, in WILL THE LAST
REPORTER PLEASE TURN OUT THE LIGHTS: THE COLLAPSE OF JOURNALISM AND WHAT CAN BE
DONE TO FIX IT, supra note 128, at 278–79.
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information mission.” 180 As Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel write in The
Elements of Journalism, journalists in large numbers subscribe to the belief
that “[t]he central purpose of journalism is to tell the truth so that people will
have the information that they need to be sovereign.” 181
2. Personalization vs. Community
Every day, viewers around the world log one billion hours watching
YouTube. 182 About seventy percent of that time, viewers are not watching
content that they sought out, but rather, content that YouTube’s algorithm
selected for them. 183 YouTube’s goal is to make its website “sticky” so that
users stay on it. 184 To do that, not only does the site recommend personalized
content, but it also automatically plays those recommended videos from a
bottomless queue. 185 The phenomenon has a name: the YouTube rabbit
hole. 186
YouTube’s attention-capture efforts are not unique. In order to be
sticky, platforms highly personalize the user experience. Two people may
conduct an identical Google search and receive different results. 187 Facebook
prioritizes items in one person’s News Feed differently than another

180. See KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 37, at 20–21 (quoting William Damon & Howard
Gardner, Reporting the News in an Age of Accelerating Power and Pressure: The Private Quest to
Preserve the Public Trust 10 (Nov. 6, 1997) (unpublished manuscript)).
181. See id. at 17, 20. To be clear, this information-providing function is broader than the
press’s watchdog role.
182. Jack Nicas, How YouTube Drives People to the Internet’s Darkest Corners, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 7, 2018, 1:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-youtube-drives-viewers-to-theinternets-darkest-corners-1518020478.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. See Mitch Joel, The Billion Hour YouTube Rabbit Hole (And It’s Growing), MEDIUM (Feb.
28, 2017), https://medium.com/@mitchjoel/the-billion-hour-youtube-rabbit-hole-and-its-growinge9ecd9925ce4.
186. See Kate Drozynski, The 10 Stages of Falling Down a YouTube Rabbit Hole, MTV NEWS
(Sept. 27, 2015), http://www.mtv.com/news/2283473/youtube-rabit-hole/; Nicas, supra note 182;
BlindBastard, Definition: “YouTube Rabbit Hole,” URBAN DICTIONARY (Apr. 17, 2016),
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=youtube%20rabbit%20hole.
187. See Lisa Gevelber, It’s All About ‘Me’—How People are Taking Search Personally, THINK
WITH GOOGLE (Jan. 2018), https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/consumer-insights/personal-needssearch-trends/; Larry Magid, How (and Why) to Turn Off Google’s Personalized Search Results,
FORBES (Jan. 13, 2012, 10:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2012/01/13/how-andwhy-to-turn-off-googles-personalized-search-results/#11b14c4338f2.
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person’s. 188 Apple News advertises it is “personalized to your interests.” 189
Twitter, too, advertises personalized news updates. 190
Personalization is a key facet of the platform business model. Per the
platforms, personalization promotes engagement (i.e., more user time spent
on the platform). 191 Engagement allows platforms to show the user more
advertising, thereby increasing profit. 192 Engagement also allows the
platforms more opportunities to collect user data. More data, in turn, allows
for more targeted advertising, again increasing profits.193
In contrast, the press has not catered to an audience of one. Doing so
would have been financially disastrous in the pre-internet days, but it also
runs contrary to the journalistic value of “try[ing] to serve the interests of the
widest community possible.” 194 In one example, several years ago, The
Poynter Institute, a journalism nonprofit, collected responses to this question:
why does local journalism matter? 195 The resulting article excerpting

188. See Josh Constine, How Facebook News Feed Works, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 6, 2016, 3:07
PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/06/ultimate-guide-to-the-news-feed/
(describing
“personalized relevancy score” and how it impacts hierarchies in News Feed).
189. See APPLE NEWS, https://www.apple.com/apple-news/ (last visited May 5, 2020).
190. See Keith Coleman, Product: See What’s Happening!, TWITTER (June 13, 2018),
https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/product/2018/see_whats_happening.html; Hillary K.
Grigonis, Twitter’s Happening Now, Explore, Are About to Get More Personal, DIGITAL TRENDS
(June 13, 2018, 3:08 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/twitter-happening-nowpersonalized-news/.
191. See Adam Mosseri, Building a Better News Feed For You, FACEBOOK (June 29, 2016),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/06/building-a-better-news-feed-for-you/
(stating
that
Facebook aims “to show people the stories that are most relevant to them”).
192. See Emily Bell, Facebook Creates Orwellian Headache as News Is Labelled Politics,
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/mediablog/2018/jun/24/facebook-journalism-publishers (noting that targeted advertising represents
ninety-eight percent of Facebook’s revenue). To be fair, not all platforms are created equal. For
example, Apple touts that it does not monetize customer data. See Leonid Bershidsky, Why
Microsoft and Apple Don’t Need to Sell Your Data, N.Y. POST (Apr. 3, 2018, 5:03 AM),
https://nypost.com/2018/04/03/why-microsoft-and-apple-dont-need-to-sell-your-data/. Yet, Apple
collects vast amounts of information from users and is able to leverage it to sell users more of its
own products. Id.
193. Once Considered a Boon to Democracy, Social Media Have Started to Look Like Its
Nemesis, ECONOMIST (Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/11/04/onceconsidered-a-boon-to-democracy-social-media-have-started-to-look-like-its-nemesis (“The more
people use their addictive-by-design social media, the more attention social-media companies can
sell to advertisers—and the more data about the users’ behaviour they can collect for themselves.”);
Zeynep Tufekci, Facebook’s Surveillance Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/opinion/facebook-cambridge-analytica.html
(“Facebook
makes money, in other words, by profiling us and then selling our attention to advertisers, political
actors and others. These are Facebook’s true customers, whom it works hard to please.”).
194. See KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 37, at 40.
195. See Melody Kramer, Why Does Local Matter? Let’s Ask Our Audience., POYNTER (June
23, 2015), https://www.poynter.org/news/why-does-local-matter-lets-ask-our-audience.
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responses had the word “community” in it forty-one times. 196 One local
newspaper editor said that newspapers “frame the conversation in a
community. Usually, that’s as simple as shifting the conversation to be
centered on others instead of on ourselves.” 197
In fact, sociologists argue that news itself creates communities and this
process is crucial for democracy. As media scholar Michael Schudson wrote
in his 2003 book, The Sociology of News: “That you and I read the same front
page or see the same television news as do the president of the United States
and the chairperson of IBM is empowering; the impression it promotes of
equality and commonality, illusion though it is, sustains a hope of democratic
life.” 198
3. Agnosticism vs. Commitment
On a 2016 trip that included a private audience with the Pope, Mark
Zuckerberg told a group of Italian students that Facebook is “a tech company,
not a media company . . . . We build the tools, we do not produce any
content.” 199 This agnosticism regarding content has long been a legal and
marketing strategy for platforms.
Distancing themselves from the media label allows platforms to absolve
themselves of significant responsibility. Under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, platforms are generally not liable for content
because their sites are merely intermediaries. 200 Platforms have been careful
to advertise that they are conduits and not creators. Facebook merely helps
you find “the things that you care about.” 201 It is just a tool; it is not “the
things” themselves.
Content is not unimportant to platforms. But it is a means, a commodity
to be curated and leveraged to another purpose. Training the eyes and minds
of users on their sites is the goal. 202 With this in mind, Facebook, in
particular, goes out of its way to avoid content that might bristle users. That

196. See id.
197. Id.
198. See SCHUDSON, supra note 109, at 24.
199. See Bell & Owen, supra note 17; Giulia Segreti, Facebook CEO Says Group Will Not
(Aug.
29,
2016,
1:00
PM),
Become
a
Media
Company,
REUTERS
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-zuckerberg-idUSKCN1141WN.
200. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
201. See Ravi Somaiya, How Facebook Is Changing the Way Its Users Consume Journalism,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/27/business/media/how-facebookis-changing-the-way-its-users-consume-journalism.html?_r=0 (quoting Greg Marra, a Facebook
engineer).
202. Once Considered a Boon to Democracy, Social Media Have Started to Look Like its
Nemesis, supra note 193 (“It is the overall paying of attention, not the specific information, that
matters.”).
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includes news. In 2018, Facebook announced that its News Feed would
prioritize posts from users’ family and friends over those from “businesses,
brands, and media.” 203 According to Facebook, “passively reading articles
or watching videos” from these entities may not be as good for our “wellbeing” as posts from families and friends. 204
With a more cynical take, communications and technology scholar
Professor Kate Crawford paraphrased the attitude of Silicon Valley engineers
and technologists she interviewed about news values saying: “If somebody
just wants to read news stories about marmots or the Kardashians, that’s
completely fine.” 205 Again conveying an agnosticism to the relative
importance or worth of content, a senior news app designer told Professor
Crawford he did not believe news app designers, like himself, consider
journalistic values as they work. 206 In fact, the designer said, “I think there
are no ideals being pursued.” 207
Professor Crawford conducted these interviews in 2014. Now, with the
benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see how such attitudes foretold the ways in
which disinformation could emerge and mutate on platforms. Today,
marmots and Kardashians are far from the most dangerous subject matter on
platforms. Disinformation and its amplification on platforms are an
outgrowth of content agnosticism. 208
For its part, the press has historically refused content-agnosticism.
Explainers, tick-tocks, profiles, brights, briefs, and breakers—these are just
some of the types of stories journalists produce. 209 These stories are not
203. See
Mark
Zuckerberg,
FACEBOOK
(Jan.
11,
2018),
https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104413015393571.
204. Id.
205. See Columbia Journalism School, Journalism + Silicon Valley Conference—Full Day—
(Nov.
13,
2015),
Tow
Center
Nov.
12,
2015,
YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Qftw6VkDKQ&t=54m35s.
206. See Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, A Liminal Press, 3 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 192, 200
(2014), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21670811.2014.922322.
207. Id. See also Nicas, supra note 182 (quoting a Northeastern University computer-science
professor as saying, “The editorial policy of these new platforms is to essentially not have one”).
208. See Whitney Phillips, The Toxins We Carry, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Fall 2019),
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/truth-pollution-disinformation.php (discussing the scourge of
disinformation); Alice Marwick & Rebecca Lewis, Media Manipulation and Disinformation
Online,
DATA
&
SOC’Y
17
(2017),
https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_MediaManipulationAndDisinformationOnline.pd
f (noting “[s]everal internet platforms have become fertile ground for the growth of conspiracy
theories” because, in part, of the lack of “the barrier of traditional media gatekeepers”).
209. Tick-tocks are news stories that focus on chronological narrative. Alexander Burns &
Mike Allen, The Art of the “Tick-Tock,” POLITICO (Dec. 6, 2009, 9:57 A.M.),
https://www.politico.com/story/2009/12/the-art-of-the-tick-tock-030248. A profile is a feature
story focused on a person. Newspaper Journalism Glossary, TOP OF THE FOLD: CHRONICLES OF A
CUB REPORTER (Jan. 14, 2009), https://topofthefold.wordpress.com/2009/01/14/newspaperjournalism-glossary/. A bright is a “[s]hort, amusing story.” Glossary of Terms: Journalism, WALL
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merely “content.”
And watchdog journalism—a specialized, timeconsuming, and expensive brand of journalism—is a calling for some
journalists. 210 Watchdog journalism is intended to expose corruption and to
prompt a corrective response. 211 Investigative journalists measure their
success by the probes they have sparked, officials who have been ousted, or
legislation that has been passed as a result of their work. Watchdog
journalism often needles, incenses, and offends. It does so by design. 212 It
is not there for the well-being of any one user. Rather, its intent is the wellbeing of the citizenry and our democratic form of government. 213
4. Speed vs. Deliberation and Process
Platforms are infatuated with speed and optimized for immediacy.
“Mobile speed is good for everyone, everywhere,” announced a 2016 Google
report. 214 When searching on Google, users are told not only how many
results the platform has identified, but also the speed at which it identified
them down to the hundredth of a second. Twitter posts indicate how long
they have been lingering on the platform—almost as if anything more than
twenty-four hours old has spoiled. 215 Snaps—posts on the platform
Snapchat—last for hours (not days) before vanishing. 216
With the constant stream of loud, bright, and glittery things on the
internet, users are hard-pressed to spend too much time on any one thing.
ST. J. (1998), http://info.wsj.com/college/glossary/journalism.pdf. Briefs are short news stories.
Newspaper Journalism Glossary, supra. “Breakers” comes from breaking news, which is news that
is unfolding. See Glossary of Terms: Journalism, supra (defining “break” as “[w]hen a news
development becomes known and available.”).
210. See Hamilton, supra note 26, at 2 (discussing the high cost of watchdog reporting).
211. See Richard J. Tofel, Non-Profit Journalism: Issues Around Impact, PROPUBLICA 4
(noting that while explanatory journalism “seeks primarily to elucidate,” investigative journalism
“seeks change”), https://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/assets/about/LFA_ProPublica-whitepaper_2.1.pdf?_ga=2.114974020.295332764.1579033917-1139745163.1579033917 (last visited
Feb. 4, 2020).
212. See Butch Ward, Watchdog Culture: Why You Need It, How You Can Build It, POYNTER
(May 26, 2005), https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/2005/watchdog-culture-why-you-needit-how-you-can-build-it/ (describing a newsroom committed to watchdog journalism as “a pit bull,
not a poodle”).
213. See id. (noting that watchdog journalism is about “serving the public interest”).
THE
NEED
FOR
MOBILE
SPEED
10
214. GOOGLE,
https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/_qs/documents/2340/bc22e_The_Need_for_Mobile_Speed__FINAL_1.pdf (last visited Dec. 11, 2019).
215. See, Anatomy of a Tweet—Must See Guide for Teachers, EDUC. TECH. & MOBILE
LEARNING (June 25, 2013), https://www.educatorstechnology.com/2013/06/anatomy-of-tweetmust-see-guide-for.html (showing a tweet and how the “Time and/or Date of Tweet” is posted in its
right-hand corner).
216. See
When
Does
Snapchat
Delete
Snaps
and
Chats?,
SNAPCHAT,
https://support.snapchat.com/en-US/a/when-are-snaps-chats-deleted. Unopened chat messages on
Snapchat may last up to thirty days. See id.
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The fear of missing out looms large. 217 Facebook’s News Feed or Twitter’s
TweetDeck (which allows users to see multiple, customizable Twitter feeds
on a single screen) lets users scroll images, text, and video rapidly. 218 A
common sequence emerges: scan, dive shallowly into content, scan, reload,
repeat. The feed is bottomless, and every refresh promises something new.
It is true that speed is important in journalism; journalists often have to
work quickly. The Pulitzers have an entire category devoted to “Breaking
News.” 219 Watchdog journalism, however, tends to plod. As Bill Kovach
and Tom Rosenstiel wrote in The Elements of Journalism:
More often than not, revelation comes not from a single document
suddenly found, but from discoveries slowly earned—winning the
trust of sources, noticing a fragment of information, recognizing its
possibilities, triangulating that with fragments from other
information, fitting the pieces together, and establishing proof to a
level that will satisfy lawyers. 220
Take, for example, the investigative stories that helped galvanize the
#MeToo Movement and won Pulitzers for the New York Times reporters and
the New Yorker reporter who authored them. New York Times reporters Jodi
Kantor and Meaghan Twohey worked on the first article chronicling
allegations of sexual misconduct by film mogul Harvey Weinstein for four
months. 221 Ronan Farrow of The New Yorker worked on his initial article
about Weinstein for approximately a year.222
All of this invested time makes watchdog journalism the most expensive
type of journalism to produce. A study by a Stanford economist showed that
funding investigative reporters is significantly more expensive than beat
reporters. 223 As just one example, a “conservative[] estimate” of the cost

217. Ben Schreckinger, The Home of FOMO, BOS. MAG. (July 29, 2014),
https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2014/07/29/fomo-history/ (describing the fear of missing
out or “FOMO” as “the ailment of our cultural moment”).
218. See How to Use TweetDeck, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/how-touse-tweetdeck (last visited Feb. 4, 2020) (describing how TweetDeck allows users “a more
convenient Twitter experience” by allowing for multiple timelines and accounts in one interface).
219. See Breaking News, PULITZER PRIZES, https://www.pulitzer.org/prize-winners-bycategory/205 (last visited Dec. 12, 2019) (describing the category as one honoring reporting “that,
as quickly as possible, captures events accurately as they occur”).
220. KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 37, at 191.
221. See Isaac Chotiner, The Weinstein Break, SLATE (Oct. 11, 2017, 7:33 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/interrogation/2017/10/jodi_kantor_on_how_she_
broke_the_harvey_weinstein_story.html.
222. Kim Masters & Chris Gardner, Harvey Weinstein Lawyers Battling N.Y. Times, New
Yorker over Potentially Explosive Stories (Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 4, 2017, 2:33 PM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/harvey-weinstein-lawyers-battling-ny-times-newyorker-potentially-explosive-stories-1045724.
223. Professor James T. Hamilton, in a 2009 paper on subsidizing the news business, suggested
that funding a beat reporter for a year in North Carolina would cost $61,500, while funding an
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spent by ProPublica, a nonprofit investigative journalism site, on a series
about the dangers of acetaminophen was $750,000. 224 The stories took two
years to produce. 225
But the siren song of the audience seeking the live tweet or the hot take
is constant. Carving out time and space for watchdog journalism is a
challenge. “The daily churn of doing news keeps you from getting to more
meaningful, deeper truths, and you just are reactive,” according to Jim
Nelson, the former editor of GQ. 226 Readers and viewers want news not only
right after it happens, but while it is happening. News organizations have
taken to making educated guesses about what news might break and writing
the story in advance so that it can be rolled out within minutes if needed.227
The frenzy takes its toll. “I’m so tired,” New York Times White House
correspondent Maggie Haberman said in the documentary The Fourth
Estate. 228 “But also, like, I really don’t know how to stop at this point,
either.” 229
5. Scale vs. Targeted Impact
In Silicon Valley speak, “scale” is the obsession with making things
infinitely bigger. 230 For platforms, the goal is to have more and more users,

investigative reporting unit (including an editor, three reporters, research, travel, and legal expenses)
that might produce two or three investigative series per year, would cost $500,000. See Hamilton,
supra note 26, at 3; see also JAMES T. HAMILTON, DEMOCRACY’S DETECTIVES: THE ECONOMICS
OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM 10 (2016) (“Investigative reporting involves original work, about
substantive issues, that someone wants to keep secret. It is costly, underprovided in the marketplace,
and often opposed.”). Hamilton seems to distinguish between beat reporters (who may cover, for
example local courts or the environment) and investigative reporters in part by their output. He
assumes investigative reporters would produce two to three investigative series per year.
Presumably, beat reporters would produce far more news. See Hamilton, supra note 26, at 3.
224. Peter Osnos, These Journalists Spent Two Years and $750,000 Covering One Story,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/10/these-journalistsspent-two-years-and-750-000-covering-one-story/280151/.
225. Id.
226. #268: Jim Nelson, LONGFORM PODCAST, at 8:00 (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://longform.org/posts/longform-podcast-268-jim-nelson.
227. See Charles Bethea, News Outlets Are Prewriting Stories About Officials Getting Fired to
YORKER
(Aug.
1,
2018),
Keep
up
with
the
Trump
Era,
NEW
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/news-outlets-are-prewriting-stories-about-officialsgetting-fired-to-keep-up-with-the-trump-era (noting “the demands of digital publishing” are a
reason for the change). This phenomenon is not new (it has long been done with obituaries), but
the pressure to post news quickly may be prompting it to occur even more often. See id.
228. Simon Vandore, Fire, Fury, and “The Failing New York Times,” SBS (updated June 21,
2018,
10:43
AM),
https://www.sbs.com.au/guide/article/2018/05/28/fourth-estate-SBSVICELAND (quoting THE FOURTH ESTATE (Showtime 2018)).
229. Id.
230. For example, LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman has a podcast called Masters of Scale about
“how great entrepreneurs take their companies from zero to a gazillion in ingenious fashion.” About
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which means curating more and more information and enabling more and
more sharing. 231 A handful of platforms have become enormously successful
at this. Facebook has approximately 2.4 billion monthly active users. 232 It
owns Instagram, which has one billion active monthly users. 233 Google does
not release data on how many searches it processes, but some have guessed
it is on the order of billions daily. 234 And Google owns YouTube, which has
two billion monthly users. 235
Given the breadth and openness of the internet, the rapid sharing of
content among users is perhaps a foregone conclusion. 236 See, for example,
the ice bucket challenge, exploding watermelons, and eating Tide Pods.237
Platforms incentivize virality by baking its promise into the infrastructure. 238
Take Twitter, for example. Its hashtag is a sorting mechanism that allows
the platform and users to amass all tweets on a particular topic (e.g., #Resist,
#MAGA). 239
Masters of Scale, MASTERS OF SCALE, https://mastersofscale.com/#/about-us (last visited Feb. 4,
2020).
231. This is consistent with Crawford and Ananny’s interviews, in which they heard from
engineers and designers that “[b]y far and away, the biggest value was ‘We just want users . . . We
just want to be the most popular app in the space.’” See Columbia Journalism School, supra note
205, at 54:10, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0Qftw6VkDKQ&t=54m10s.
232. Facebook
Fast
Facts,
CNN
(Sept.
11,
2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/02/11/world/facebook-fast-facts/index.html (noting 2.41 billion
monthly active users worldwide as of June 30, 2019).
233. See Josh Constine, Instagram Hits 1 Billion Monthly Users, up from 800M in September,
TECHCRUNCH (June 20, 2018, 1:58 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/20/instagram-1-billionusers/.
234. See Danny Sullivan, Google Now Handles at Least 2 Trillion Searches per Year, SEARCH
ENGINE LAND (May 24, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://searchengineland.com/google-now-handles-2999-trillion-searches-per-year-250247; How Many Google Searches Per Day on Average in 2019?,
ARDOR SEO, https://ardorseo.com/blog/how-many-google-searches-per-day-2018/.
235. See Todd Spangler, YouTube Now Has 2 Billion Monthly Users, Who Watch 250 Million
(May
3,
2019,
10:14
AM),
Hours
on
TV
Screens
Daily,
VARIETY
https://variety.com/2019/digital/news/youtube-2-billion-users-tv-screen-watch-time-hours1203204267/.
236. See Virality, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/virality (last updated Feb. 4,
2020) (“The tendency of an image, video, or piece of information to be circulated rapidly and widely
from one Internet user to another; the quality or fact of being viral.”).
237. Alexandra Sifferlin, Here’s How the ALS Ice Bucket Challenge Actually Started, TIME
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://time.com/3136507/als-ice-bucket-challenge-started/; Tasneem Nashrulla,
We Blew up a Watermelon and Everyone Lost Their Freaking Minds, BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 8,
2016, 4:48 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/tasneemnashrulla/we-blew-up-a-watermelon-andeveryone-lost-their-freaking-min?utm_term=.snnEo3eLd#.blP18AwL9; The Strange Story of How
Tide
Pod
Eating
Went
Viral,
FORBES
(Feb.
5,
2018,
12:52
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2018/02/05/the-strange-story-of-how-tide-pod-eating-wentviral/#243de6874932.
238. See supra note 236.
239. #Resist and #MAGA (and variations on these hashtags, like #Resistance and
#MakeAmericaGreatAgain) were the “[m]ost tweeted activism hashtags” in 2017. See Jennifer
Machin, Twitter’s Most Popular Tweets, Accounts, and Hashtags of 2017, MASHABLE (Dec. 5,
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Scale (like personalization) functions exponentially. It is selfreinforcing. The platforms already have so many users and are such an
essential way of organizing and transmitting information that those seeking
influence, from celebrities to politicians to advocates, use the platforms as a
tool. In doing so, they generate more activity on platforms and bring in even
more users. 240
Although it may be too sweeping to say investigative reporting is not
scalable, it is difficult to scale. Although in the Pentagon Papers case, Justice
Black wrote that a role of the press was to “bare the secrets of
government,” 241 watchdog reporting is not always that gripping or
glamorous. Perhaps consequently, it is not always all that popular, at least
relatively. 242
Investigative journalism is the leafy green of the news diet—vital for
good health but not necessarily what people choose to eat first. This is borne
out by research. According to one study of 40,000 stories posted on news
sites in North and South America and Western Europe, the stories that the
audience pays most attention to are about sports, crime, entertainment, and
weather. 243 They may be great journalism, but they are not, generally
speaking, stories about government and its inner workings. For example, a
study by the Columbia Journalism Review of the most read stories for leading
news organizations (including NPR, CNN, ABC News, and the Los Angeles
Times) found that despite the belief that President Donald Trump dominated
the news cycle, in reality, stories about hurricanes or mass shootings were
even more widely read. 244

2017), https://mashable.com/2017/12/05/twitter-most-popular-2017/#CzNx3U49zqqL. Hashtags
perform a similar function on Instagram.
240. See
Josef
Adalian,
Inside
the
Binge
Factory,
VULTURE,
http://www.vulture.com/2018/06/how-netflix-swallowed-tv-industry.html (describing “a simple
logic” behind Facebook and Amazon’s success that “[g]rowth begets more growth begets more
growth”).
241. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
242. Likewise, to the extent that the watchdog reporting is local news reporting, it is especially
difficult to scale. See Harry Siegel, Why We Need Local Journalism: Look Around at How
Vulnerable We Are Right Now, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 22, 2018, 5:00 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-why-we-need-local-journalism-20180720story.html (“The thing I love about local news is that it doesn’t scale. It happens one court hearing
or campaign or crime at a time so that you can fairly try and connect political decisions to individual
people, the life of the city to that of its inhabitants.”).
243. See BOCZKOWSKI & MITCHELSTEIN, supra note 27, at 2.
244. See Justin Ray, The Most Read Stories Since Trump’s Election Win Might Surprise You,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/covering_trump/trump-electionstories-most.php.
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Today, some journalists view diverging from the prevailing narrative—
or that which might scale or go viral—as a risk. 245 “We are telling stories
that other outlets aren’t telling, which is almost to our detriment in the world
of viral news,” Delaney Simmons, Director of Digital Content and Social for
New York public radio station WNYC, said. 246 “When it comes to the way
Facebook and Twitter currently surface trending content and breaking news,
it’s not about the story that no one has. It’s about the story that everyone
has.” 247
B. The Changing Nature of Editorial Discretion and Muzzling the
Watchdog
For decades, decisions about what to publish have been made around a
big table in a newsroom. Journalists have discussed, debated, and employed
their collective judgment to determine what is newsworthy. 248 As the word
“newsworthy” itself indicates, this judgment has involved not simply what is
new or enticing, but also what is important and legitimate. Journalists have
not viewed their role as merely to entertain or capture attention (although
they have recognized and capitalized on this as a means to profit), but to
provide a public service. 249 They have attempted to discern, however
inelegantly or incorrectly, not simply whether something qualifies as news
but whether that news is worthy of citizens’ attention. 250 One type of news
that has perennially qualified is investigative or watchdog reporting.

245. See Phillips, supra note 23, at 24. “[S]ocial media amplify the financial incentive to join
the herd,” Foer explained. FOER, supra note 25, at 148. For news, “[t]he results are highly
derivative.” Id. This derivative nature of news was also described by Professor Caitlin Petre when
she wrote, “[T]he leaderboards ranking stories and staffers don’t just harness employees’
competitive tendencies; they shape the very nature of competition in the media field, namely by
turning it further inward.” Caitlin Petre, The Traffic Factories: Metrics at Chartbeat, Gawker
Media, and The New York Times, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (May 7, 2015),
https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/the_traffic_factories_metrics_at_chartbeat_gawker_media
_and_the_new_york_times.php.
246. See Bell & Owen, supra note 17.
247. See id.; John Warner, The Best Algorithm-Driven Writing Instruction You Can Imagine,
INSIDE HIGHER ED, (June 26, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/blogs/just-visiting/bestalgorithm-driven-writing-instruction-you-can-imagine (“Speaking at a conference, Allison
Woodruff[,] a human-computer interaction researcher[,] remarked ‘Machine learning is good if you
want the future to look like the past.’”).
248. According to journalism scholars, “[N]ews . . . is that which ‘is judged to be newsworthy
by journalists, who exercise their news sense within the constraints of the news organisations within
which they operate.’” See Deirdre O’Neill & Tony Harcup, News Values and Selectivity, in THE
HANDBOOK OF JOURNALISM STUDIES 161 (Karin Wahl-Jorgensen & Thomas Hanitzsch eds. 2009).
249. See KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 37, at 17 (“It is difficult . . . to separate the
concept of journalism from the concept of creating community and later democracy.”).
250. The legal definition of newsworthiness (an affirmative defense to privacy torts in many
jurisdictions) captures this. In order to be newsworthy, information must generally not simply be
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Platforms have significantly altered both the ability of the press to
discern newsworthiness and the process for doing so. They have been able
to do this in large part because of their size. Platform values and norms,
which disincentivize watchdog reporting, dominate. 251 As a result, the
press’s ability to perform a core structural role—to be a check on
government—is not obliterated, but it is compromised. While Section II.A.
detailed the ways platform and press values differ, this Section describes both
the mechanics of how platform values are imposed upon the press and also
how the press has, at times, adopted platform values.
1. Top-Down Influences on Editorial Discretion
For President John F. Kennedy, the relatively new technology of
television was a means of speaking directly to citizens, unfiltered by the
media. 252 During his presidency, President Kennedy held a televised press
conference almost every other week. 253 But even though President Kennedy
appreciated directly connecting with his audience, he still viewed the press
as essential. “[T]here is a terrific disadvantage not having the abrasive
quality of the press applied to you daily, to an administration,” he said in a
1962 interview with NBC. 254 “[E]ven though we never like it, and even
though we wish they didn’t write it, and even though we disapprove, there
isn’t any doubt that we could not do the job at all in a free society without a
very, very active press.” 255 The press, President Kennedy said, was “a check
really on what is going on in the administration.” 256
In the second half of the twentieth century, the press applied its
“abrasive quality” to government regularly. And although the current
administration is still subject to this rough treatment, many state and local
governments across the country are faced with less of a scrub than they once
were. Some are altogether unmonitored. Tethered by platforms and
audience, the press is both less able and less incentivized to act in its
watchdog capacity. Platforms are behind both of these changes.

of interest but be of “legitimate public interest.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D,
cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
251. See supra Section II.A.1–5.
252. See John F. Kennedy and the Press, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY &
MUSEUM,
https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/John-F-Kennedy-and-the-Press.aspx
(last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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The number of full-time newspaper reporters in statehouses dropped
thirty-five percent between 2003 and 2014. 257 Most obviously, with fewer
reporters and fewer newspapers, the press is simply unable to provide the
checking function it once did. In an article entitled The Capitol Press Corpse,
the “dean” of the Austin, Texas press corps, Paul Burka, said, “It’s the bootson-the-ground principle. The more troops you have, and the more visible
they are, the more the bad guys fear you and the less likely they are to do
mischief.” 258 Likewise, a reporter at Eugene, Oregon’s Register Guard said,
“We’re treading water.” 259 The capitol press corps in Salem, Oregon, has
dropped from thirty-seven to thirteen since 2005. 260 And it is not only
reporters who are lamenting the losses in statehouses nationally. “The public
is not being kept aware of important policy decisions that are being made that
will affect their daily lives,” said Gene Rose, a former communications
director for the National Conference of State Legislatures. 261
Measuring how much news we are missing—and what the impact of
that news would be—is next to impossible. But it is likely a very significant
amount. This was the warning from New York Daily News editor Josh
Greenman in July of 2018 after the paper’s parent company, Tronc, fired half
of the paper’s reporters.262 Greenman wrote: “Without the Daily News, the
police killing of Eric Garner may never have come to light. Nor would we
know about a cover-up at the New York City Housing Authority that left
unknown numbers of children vulnerable to lead contamination.” 263
Platforms, of course, also have tremendous impact on those newsrooms
still operating. Their algorithms are a top-down mediation tool. When a user
opens News Feed, behind the scenes, Facebook’s algorithm has examined all
of the content recently posted by that user’s friends, by members of groups

257. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S SHIFTING STATEHOUSE PRESS: CAN NEW PLAYERS
COMPENSATE FOR LOST LEGACY REPORTERS? 13 (2014), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/13/2014/07/Americas-Shifting-Statehouse-Press_full_report.pdf.
258. See Paul Burka, The Capitol Press Corpse, TEX. MONTHLY (Jan. 2008),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/the-capitol-press-corpse/; Paul Burka, TEX. MONTHLY,
https://www.texasmonthly.com/author/paul-burka/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
259. Anna Marum, Oregon’s Dwindling Statehouse Reporters Are “Treading Water,” COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (June 13, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/oregon-capitolpress-corps.php.
260. Id.
261. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 257, at 7.
262. Josh Greenman, Local Journalism Is Sick; Don’t Misdiagnose the Disease, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Jul. 26, 2018, 5:55 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-local-journalismis-sick-20180725-story.html.
263. Id.; SCOOPNEST, https://www.scoopnest.com/user/joshgreenman/1021373539084103680the-daily-news-led-the-charge-to-get-911-first-responders-health-benefits-exposed-widespreadabuse-o (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
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that user belongs to, or on pages that user has liked. 264 The algorithm has
assigned a score to each of these posts. 265 It then prioritizes those items with
the highest score, buoying them to the top of the feed. 266
Thus, a formula rather than a journalist decides which news the reader
has the opportunity to read and, by its placement in the news feed, how likely
it is that the user will actually read it.267 Platforms do not share information
about how their algorithms function—except in the broadest of sketches—
meaning that the platforms’ editorial process is a black box. 268 Yet, as
detailed, platform norms and goals, in many instances, differ vastly from
those of journalists.
Platforms are also exercising editorial discretion by dictating what form
news takes. 269 For example, in the last several years, Facebook has pushed
news organizations to produce news in a video format. In 2016, to promote
its Facebook Live feature, Facebook paid out millions to news organizations
including CNN, The New York Times, Vox, and Mashable, to create video. 270
Again in 2018, to promote another new video product, Facebook Watch, the
platform solicited news video “tailored to succeed in a social
environment.” 271
And even without Facebook’s explicit push, many news organizations
began emphasizing video believing that algorithms preferred it. 272 The
movement among publishers was so big that it was labeled the “pivot to
video.” 273 As it turns out, the pivot was a mistake. Viewers have not been

264. See Will Oremus, Who Controls Your Facebook Feed, SLATE (Jan. 3, 2016, 8:02 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/cover_story/2016/01/how_facebook_s_news_feed_algor
ithm_works.html (describing algorithms as “a set of concrete instructions by which a given problem
may be solved”).
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. Bell & Owen, supra note 17 (“While publishers can freely post to Facebook, it is the
algorithm that determines what reaches readers.”).
268. See generally PASQUALE, supra note 21 (describing the black-box nature of algorithms).
269. See Bell & Owen, supra note 17 (noting that platforms dictate “what format and type of
journalism flourishes”).
270. See Mathew Ingram, Facebook Is Paying Millions to News Outlets and Celebrities to
Create Live Video, FORTUNE (June 21, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/21/facebook-paying-livevideo/.
271. Sara Fisher, Scoop: Facebook Aiming to Launch News for Watch This Summer, AXIOS
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.axios.com/facebook-aiming-to-launch-news-for-watch-this-summer1520911507-46955a82-61d6-4295-a978-16508421720f.html.
272. See Heidi N. Moore, The Secret Cost of Pivoting to Video, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/business_of_news/pivot-to-video.php; Zach Schonfeld, MTV
News—and Other Sites—Are Frantically Pivoting to Video. It Won’t Work, NEWSWEEK (June 30,
2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/mtv-news-video-vocativ-media-ads-pivot-630223.
273. Moore, supra note 272.
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as keen as Facebook predicted to watch their news online, and video has not
proved lucrative for many news organizations. 274
But even if the effort had succeeded, that would not necessarily put news
organizations at ease—at least not for any length of time. Platforms can
change priorities without warning. News organizations only become aware
of such a change when traffic to their sites inexplicably spikes or plummets.
They then scramble to assess the benefits or losses. The uncertainty is
exacerbated because many large news organizations post to an array of
platforms. 275 Journalists are in a constant state of uncertainty about how a
key part of their distribution network will function. “Every publisher knows
that, at best, they are sharecroppers on Facebook’s massive industrial farm,”
according to Wired Editor in Chief Nicholas Thompson and Fred
Vogelstein. 276 “And journalists know that the man who owns the farm has
the leverage.” 277
Again, none of this is to say that the news industry is blameless. 278 The
press has now struggled for decades to come up with a viable online business
model for journalism. These efforts have often been clumsy and misguided.
Very few legacy news organizations have figured out how to profit online—
The New York Times and The Washington Post are among the few. (The
latter had the benefit of being purchased by a billionaire tech executive. 279)
Yet, at times, it also feels as if the platforms are holding the press’s collective
head underwater. Platforms have profited handsomely while paying little to
nothing for content generated by journalists. Their executives have spoken

274. See Susie Banikarim, R.I.P. Pivot to Video (2017–2017), NIEMANLAB (2018),
http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/12/r-i-p-pivot-to-video-2017-2017/.
275. See Bell & Owen, supra note 17 (noting, for example, that in a single week in 2017, CNN
distributed its journalism through eleven different platforms).
276. Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 150; OPEN MARKETS INST., AMERICA’S FREE PRESS
AND MONOPOLY: THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF COMPETITION POLICY IN PROTECTING INDEPENDENT
JOURNALISM
IN
AMERICA
(2018),
https://openmarketsinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/Americas-Free-Press-and-Monopoly-PDF-1.pdf (quoting Thompson &
Vogelstein, supra note 150).
277. Thompson & Vogelstein, supra note 150.
278. See Joshua Benton, Facebook’s Message to Media: We Are Not Interested in Talking to
You About Your Traffic . . . That Is the Old World and There’s No Going Back, NIEMANLAB (Aug.
13, 2018, 9:54 AM), http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/08/facebooks-message-to-media-we-are-notinterested-in-talking-to-you-about-your-traffic-that-is-the-old-world-and-there-is-no-goingback/?utm_source=Daily+Lab+email+list&utm_campaign=b482893d06dailylabemail3&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d68264fd5e-b482893d06-396214909 (“[T]he
responsibility for building a sustainable model for news is on us, not on anyone in Menlo Park,
Mountain View, Cupertino, Redmond, or Seattle.” (emphasis omitted)).
279. See Taylor Telford, Jeff Bezos Might Lose His Title as World’s Richest Person, WASH.
POST. (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/10/25/jeff-bezos-mightlose-his-title-worlds-richest-man/.
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in platitudes about bringing the world together while ignoring the damage
wrought by their innovation. 280
2. Bottom-Up Influences on Editorial Discretion
In terms of indirect influences, platforms shape everything from
newsroom organizational charts to journalists’ word choices. 281 The New
York Times, for example, employs social media editors to eye which
Facebook or Twitter posts are being shared so that they can recycle the
language used. 282 It also has “growth editors” across various news desks who
“spray[] social platforms with Times links.” 283 The Wall Street Journal has
a position entitled “Executive Emerging Media Editor, Audience
Development.” 284 News organizations also have employees who serve as
diplomats of a sort to the platforms. For example, some British publications
have created the position of Chief Customer Officer (“CCO”), whose role
often includes negotiating with Google and Facebook. 285 These newsroom
employees can sway coverage. If one of them does not think a story will
perform on platforms, it might not be assigned at all. 286
Perhaps even more impactful on editorial discretion than these
employees are the analytics that tell journalists where, when, and how their
readers are consuming news. 287 Products like Chartbeat, CrowdTangle, and
NewsWhip use analytics to tell journalists how their work is succeeding (or
280. See Erin Griffith, Facebook’s New Mission: Video Will Bring Us Together, WIRED (Nov.
3, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebooks-new-mission-video-will-bring-ustogether/ (describing Mark Zuckerberg unveiling a new Facebook mission statement: “To give
people the power to build community and bring the world closer together”).
281. Bell & Owen, supra note 17 (“News organization structures, workflows, and resource
allocation are increasingly dictated by platforms . . . .”).
282. See Shan Wang, The New York Times Is Trying to Narrow the Distance Between Reporters
and Analytics Data, NIEMANLAB (July 25, 2016), http://www.niemanlab.org/2016/07/the-newyork-times-is-trying-to-narrow-the-distance-between-reporters-and-analytics-data/.
283. Bell & Owen, supra note 17.
284. Id.
285. See Lucinda Southern, The Pivot to Paid Heralds the Rise of the Chief Customer Officers
at Publishers, DIGIDAY (Nov. 21, 2017), https://digiday.com/media/pivot-paid-heralds-rise-chiefcustomer-officer-publishers/?utm_source=CJR+Daily+News&utm_campaign=dfaa93e26bEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_05&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9c93f57676dfaa93e26b-174420317. For its part, Google has a “senior director of news and social products,”
RICHARD GRINGAS, http://www.richardgingras.com/bio.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2019), and
Facebook has a “head of global news partnerships,” Erin Corbett, Facebook Is Partnering with
Media Organizations to Launch Original News Programs, FORTUNE (June 6, 2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/06/06/facebook-cnn-abc-media-partnerships/.
286. Bell & Owen, supra note 17 (“One publisher said that if their audience team doesn’t think
a story will perform, it may not be assigned.”).
287. See Petre, supra note 245 (“One way to win the fierce competition for dwindling ad dollars
was to enlarge a publication’s audience, and metrics developed a reputation as a crucial tool for
doing just that.”).
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not) on platforms. 288 Some newsrooms project analytics onto TV screens for
all reporters to see. 289
Although little research exists measuring the impact of analytics on
newsrooms, what there is confirms that journalists use data to try to maximize
audience. 290 A study by journalism scholars at University of Texas,
University of Minnesota, and New York University found that journalists are
engaged in “an often subtle but sometimes deliberate pursuit of topics and
terminology most likely to attract traffic via search algorithms and viral
social channels.” 291 What has resulted, they said, is “a culture of the click.” 292
To be sure, it would be inaccurate and simplistic to say that reacting to
the audience is bad. Being attentive to the audience—along with editorial
values like accuracy and proportionality—is vital. Given that journalists are
not representative of Americans generally (they are more educated, more
urban, and less diverse), it is dangerous for journalists to assume that what
they think the public needs to know is definitively what the public needs to
know. 293
But the pressure on journalists to amass audience and the tools that they
have to measure whether they are successfully doing so are unprecedented.
Even journalists at established institutions are not immune. Franklin Foer
wrote that during a time when he served as the editor of The New Republic,
Chartbeat was his “master.” 294 He said he would peek at the site and its
dashboard interface while he was brushing his teeth, editing stories, and even
standing at the urinal. 295 Other journalists have called analytics “sanityruining” and like “crack cocaine.” 296 Asked whether Chartbeat is addictive
because it “speaks to an editorial mindset,” one journalist replied: “I wish I
could say yes, but no . . . you are constantly worrying about whether you’re
getting enough traffic or not. So your eyes are glued to Chartbeat because

288. See FOER, supra note 25, at 144–47.
289. See Petre, supra note 245 (indicating that The Washington Post has screens in the
newsroom that project analytics).
290. See id. (“Audience metrics have become ubiquitous in news organizations, but there has
been little empirical research on how the data is produced or how it affects newsroom culture and
journalists’ daily work.”).
291. Angela M. Lee et al., Audience Clicks and News Placement: A Study of Time-Lagged
Influence in Online Journalism, 41 COMM. RES. 510 (2014). “The more editors know about their
audience metrics, the more they become ‘sensitive to the implications of what their audience [is]
reading and why,’ altogether showing that ‘the process of “deciding what’s news” is increasingly
influenced by quantitative audience measurement techniques.’” Id. at 512.
292. Id. at 510.
293. See Betsy O’Donovan & Melody Kramer, Skepticism and Narcissism, NIEMANLAB,
http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/12/skepticism-and-narcissism/.
294. See FOER, supra note 25, at 144.
295. See id.
296. See Petre, supra note 245.
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your life depends on it.” 297 Some news organizations including Forbes and
The Oregonian have, in fact, linked reporters’ pay to audience engagement
metrics. 298 One reporter at the Des Moines Register said of watching the
traffic to his web posts, “It absolutely changes what I write.” 299
A movement is afoot among news organizations to thoughtfully
incorporate analytics. 300 Such an approach stems from a recognition that
reader input is vital to both mission and economics but also should not
supplant editorial judgment. In order for analytics to improve journalism and
rejigger the press’s economic model, news organizations are beginning to
recognize that relying on a single data point—the pageview—cannot be the
sum total of their focus. As an internal New York Times report on the
company’s future stated, “The newsroom needs a clearer understanding that
pageviews, while a meaningful yardstick, do not equal success. . . . The most
successful and valuable stories are often not those that receive the largest
number of pageviews, despite widespread newsroom assumptions.” 301
A difficulty with implementing any nuanced analytics strategy,
however, is that pageviews are the dominant metric for platforms. If
platforms remain primarily concerned with how many hits any piece of
content is getting, news organizations that rely on platforms as a distribution
network will not be able to escape this metric.
And so, prominent journalists remain concerned about the pull of
platforms. They are warning that algorithms are an existential threat to
editorial discretion—the lynchpin of a free press. As Pulitzer Prize-winning
technology reporter Julia Angwin said at a 2018 conference on the power of
platforms over the press: “Essentially journalism has become a game of how
297. Id.
298. See Lewis DVorkin, Inside Forbes: The Coming Era of the Super Journalist, FORBES (Jan.
12, 2015, 9:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lewisdvorkin/2015/01/12/inside-forbes-thecoming-era-of-the-super-journalist/#21ee7e0526ee; David Carr, Risks Abound as Reporters Play in
Traffic, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/business/media/risksabound-as-reporters-play-in-traffic.html; see also Petre, supra note 245 (discussing pay-forperformance schemes). Similarly, the blogging platform, Medium, pays certain writers based on
how many “claps” the person’s posts have received. See Jacob Kastrenakes, Medium Will Now Pay
Writers Based on How Many Claps They Get, VERGE (Aug. 22, 2017, 12:31 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/22/16180150/medium-paywall-articles-claps-author-payments.
299. THE CRISIS OF JOURNALISM RECONSIDERED: DEMOCRATIC CULTURE, PROFESSIONAL
CODES, DIGITAL FUTURE 183–84 (Jeffrey C. Alexander et al. eds., 2016) (concluding that analytics
“don’t help enrich coverage” and that instead, “the data may in fact guide journalists to make
decisions purely based on real-time, immediate audience reaction. This can result in stories that
have no lasting value to readers, and instead take on click-bait headlines”).
300. See generally Tom Rosenstiel, Solving Journalism’s Hidden Problem: Terrible Analytics,
BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Solvingjournalisms-hidden-problem.pdf (arguing for utilizing a broader array of metrics than pageviews as
a means of pursuing the journalistic mission).
301. Journalism that Stands Apart: The Report of the 2020 Group, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/projects/2020-report/index.html.
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to game the algorithm as opposed to what is the news.” 302 That is, platforms
and their algorithms are not just conduits. They are becoming the ultimate
arbiter of newsworthiness.
III. LOOKING BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO PROTECT WATCHDOG
JOURNALISM
For decades, the First Amendment has offered real and significant
protection to the Fourth Estate. 303 It has prevented prior restraints. 304 It has
given the press “breathing room” by barring the government from meddling
with decisions about newsworthiness. 305 It has also shielded the press from
liability when it makes mistakes in reporting on public figures 306 and topics
of legitimate public interest. 307
The First Amendment, too, offers protection to the Fourth Estate that
extends beyond doctrine. 308 It has sweeping cultural significance.309 The
luster of the First Amendment and the promise of its protections likely
emboldens the press in its everyday work. In an era when the press is under
sustained attack from the Trump Administration, defenders of the press have

302. Open Markets Institute, Panel 1 Discussion from the Open Markets Institute Conference,
Breaking the News: Free Speech & Democracy in the Age of Platform Monopoly, YOUTUBE (June
14, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=40HXpi0IzDk&t=21m15s [hereinafter Breaking the
News].
303. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Reflections on Whether the First Amendment is Obsolete, KNIGHT
FIRST AMENDMENT INS. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/reflections-whetherfirst-amendment-obsolete (“[T]he First Amendment, as interpreted and applied by the Supreme
Court, has been extraordinarily successful at constraining the primary evil at which the First
Amendment was directed—government censorship of unwelcome ideas and criticism.”).
304. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 702, 716, 722-23 (1931) (invalidating as creating an
impermissible “previous restraint,” a Minnesota statute outlawing “malicious, scandalous, and
defamatory newspaper[s]”).
305. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 570 (1977) (quoting Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 461 (Ohio 1976)).
306. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring “actual
malice” for defamation of a public official).
307. Many state torts for invasion of privacy have exemptions for newsworthiness. These
exemptions are designed to ensure the torts do not run afoul of the First Amendment. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 540.08(4)(a) (2015) (including exemption for matters of “legitimate public interest”).
308. See Lee C. Bollinger, Can the First Amendment Save Us?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
(Fall 2017), https://www.cjr.org/special_report/can-the-first-amendment-save-us.php (“Though the
First Amendment applies only to state action, it has become a touchstone for broader society,
influencing norms far beyond its legal reach.”).
309. See Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: Towards a Better Theory for Platform
Governance, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 337, 338 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/realtalk-about-fake-news (“As colloquially invoked, the ‘First Amendment’ channels a set of commonly
held values that are foundational to our social practices around free speech.”).
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regularly invoked the First Amendment and the principle of a free press. 310
The First Amendment is essential.
Neither First Amendment doctrine nor cultural coattails, however, can
incentivize and shield the press’s watchdog role in a Networked Press
environment in the same way that they did when the press was a Fourth
Estate. The First Amendment’s protection is bounded in two ways. First, the
state action doctrine prevents the First Amendment from being used as a
sword against platforms. 311 Platforms may be sovereign-like (scholars have
referred to them as “Facebookistan” and “Googledom” 312 and collectively as
the “New Governors” 313), but when courts have been confronted with the
question of whether or not technology platforms are state actors, courts have
found that they are not. 314 It is unlikely that courts will change tack soon. 315
Second, it is not clear that the Supreme Court embraces a theory of the
First Amendment that would readily protect investigative journalists or
watchdog journalism in a Networked Press era. It is true that black-letter
doctrine is that press speakers are no different than other speakers. 316 That
means that the First Amendment should protect individual journalists from
government interference. But this conventional reading is a narrow one. As
described in Part I, in the key cases in which the Supreme Court bestowed
the benefits of the First Amendment on the press, the Court spoke glowingly
and deferentially of the institution. Without a recognizable and robust Fourth
Estate, it is not clear that the Court would shield individual journalists in the

310. See A.G. Sulzberger, The Growing Threat to Journalism Around the World, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
23,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/opinion/press-freedom-arthursulzberger.html (“The First Amendment has served as the world’s gold standard for free speech and
the free press for two centuries.”); Washington Post’s Margaret Sullivan Calls for Relentless Pursuit
of Truth, Defense of Media, and First Amendment Freedoms, NEW ENGLAND FIRST AMENDMENT
COALITION (Feb. 24, 2017), http://nefac.org/news/washington-posts-margaret-sullivan-callsrelentless-pursuit-truth-defense-media-first-amendment-freedoms/.
311. See generally Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295
(2001) (discussing the state action requirement for a First Amendment claim and indicating that
state action only exists where “there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged
action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself’” (quoting
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974))).
312. See REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED 149 (2012) (referring to
“Facebookistan” and “Googledom”); Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807,
1808 (2012).
313. See Klonick, supra note 33, at 1603.
314. See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1996);
Wu, supra note 33 (arguing that finding platforms to be state actors would have negative
consequences because it would prevent them from combatting “trolling, flooding, abuse, and myriad
other unpleasantries” online).
315. See Klonick, supra note 33, at 1658 (arguing that it “is both unlikely and normatively
undesirable” that courts would find platforms to be state actors for purposes of imposing First
Amendment obligations on them).
316. See supra note 89.

2020]

PLATFORMS AND THE FALL OF THE FOURTH ESTATE

575

same way it did in the cases from the press’s golden era. That the Court has
not heard a case in more than a decade in which journalists sought to
vindicate rights is a cause for concern. 317 And so, although the First
Amendment is an indispensable tool in protecting the press, relying solely on
it to promote press functioning is risky.
Before examining whether other sources of law should be used to
reinvigorate the press’s watchdog role, it is worth considering whether law is
even the proper tool. Some might argue that the essence of a free press
demands just that: freedom. Perhaps the most famous First Amendment
lawyer alive, Floyd Abrams, made a version of this argument in 1979 when
he wrote, “A press that continually applies to the courts for vindication of its
right to gather information cannot credibly be the same press that tells the
same courts that what the press prints and why it prints it are not matters that
courts may even consider.” 318 In other words, the press undermines itself
when it champions its independence on the one hand and asks government to
grant that same independence on the other.
One could also argue that legal action is unnecessary because other
means could address platforms’ tethering of the press. For example, the press
could try to isolate itself. It could maintain or create its own distribution
networks. It could shift its funding structure so that far more of its income is
coming from subscriptions and less from advertising. 319 Public pressure
could be brought to bear more heavily on platforms, forcing them to
acknowledge the ways in which they function as the twenty-first-century
press and to take on some of the associated responsibility. 320

317. See RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, Don’t Expect the First Amendment to
Protect
the
Media,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
25,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/opinion/dont-expect-the-first-amendment-to-protect-themedia.html (“The Supreme Court has not decided a major press case in more than a decade, in part
because it has declined to do so, and in part because media companies, inferring the court’s relative
lack of interest, have decided not to waste their resources pressing cases.”).
318. See Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the
Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 591 (1979); Stephen I. Vladeck, Democratic
Competence, Constitutional Disorder, and Freedom of the Press, 87 WASH L. REV. 529, 548 (2012)
(discussing Abrams’s view on freedom as a “variation” on Justice Potter Stewart’s who said that
“autonomy cuts both ways”).
319. See L. Gordon Crovitz, Serving Readers Over Advertisers, NIEMANLAB,
http://www.niemanlab.org/2017/12/serving-readers-over-advertisers/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2020)
(noting “[f]or the first time in decades, several large news publishers now generate more revenues
from readers than from advertisers”).
320. At least one prominent news executive has suggested this might be a dangerous idea. See
Fight for the Future: New York Times CEO Mark Thompson’s “Breaking the News” Keynote,
DIGITAL CONTENT NEXT (June 12, 2018), https://digitalcontentnext.org/blog/2018/06/12/fight-forthe-future-new-york-times-ceo-mark-thompsons-breaking-the-news-keynote/ (expressing concern
about Facebook “set[ting] itself up as the digital world’s editor-in-chief”).
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In fact, all of these private solutions are happening in some form. And
yet, the tethering continues and may be worsening. Platforms are simply so
powerful and have so little competition that their incentives for any change
that is not profitable are limited. 321 Leaving this to the market or to public
shaming have not proven, at least to date, to be solutions.
Time itself could also be an antidote. First Amendment and technology
scholar Professor Tim Wu has argued that the power of “attention
merchants”—a label he applies to entities in the business of capturing
attention—waxes and wanes. 322 Eventually, adherents begin to feel
manipulated and resentful, and the merchants need to change tack. 323 Signs
are emerging that this may be happening with platforms. 324 Criticism of
Facebook in particular has increased dramatically in the wake of the 2016
election and the revelation about the scope of Facebook’s sharing of users’
personal data. 325 The reinvention or downfall of Facebook or any other
platform, however, seems far from imminent. The companies have burrowed
into users’ lives and routines in ways that are difficult to curb, much less
reverse. And even if these platforms were to fail in key ways, other entities—
also driven by profit and scale and speed—would gladly take their place.
But biding time is not a satisfactory option when it comes to a free press.
If the press is a “bulwark of democracy,” 326 and if, as William Blackstone
said, “[t]he liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state,”
then it seems right that law should have some role in preserving and
protecting it. 327 And the Supreme Court has written that “[i]t would be
strange indeed . . . if the grave concern for freedom of the press which
prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command

321. See
Breaking
the
News,
supra
note
302,
at
50:40,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=40HXpi0IzDk&t=50m40s.
322. See TIM WU, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS 340–41 (2016) (describing how the
advertising industry has been “left for dead at least four separate times over the past hundred years”).
323. Id. at 23 (“When audiences begin to believe that they are being ill-used—whether overloaded, fooled, tricked, or purposefully manipulated—the reaction can be severe and long-lasting
enough to have serious commercial consequences and require a significant reinvention of
approach.”).
324. See John Naughton, The Tide Is Starting to Turn Against the World’s Digital Giants,
(Sept.
24,
2017,
2:00
PM),
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/24/the-tide-is-starting-to-turn-against-techgiants-facebook-google-european-commission.
325. Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout
So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridgeanalytica-scandal-fallout.html.
326. Herbert J. Gans, News and the Media in the Digital Age: Implications for Democracy, 139
DAEDALUS, Spring 2010, at 8 (indicating “[m]odern American journalism considers itself a
‘bulwark of democracy’” in that journalists “report the news so that the citizenry can inform itself
and participate in the ‘conversation’ that journalists believe is crucial to a democracy”).
327. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931).
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that the government was without power to protect that freedom.” 328
Moreover, in an era when the press is under attack from within the
government, we should be wary of relying too heavily on established norms
and conventions—as opposed to law—for press protection. 329
To be sure, legal responses to platform pressure on the press must be
carefully calibrated. We need to be vigilant about maintaining sufficient
press autonomy. With these concerns in mind, the remainder of this Section
provides an overview of legal options that could foster the press’s watchdog
role, none of them mutually exclusive, that fall into two broad categories.
The first includes top-down options: law that tries to loosen the tether of
platforms on journalists. The second includes bottom-up options: law aimed
at incentivizing watchdog reporting.
A. Aligning Platform and Journalistic Norms: Loosening Platforms’
Tether
The top-down suggestions all involve first gaining a better
understanding of how platforms manipulate content and users. They then
seek to incentivize platforms to adopt journalistic methods and processes.
They focus on transparency, sharing of data, and hiring of journalists. Thus,
they harken back to Part II and aim to better align values and goals within the
Networked Press.
1. Algorithmic Transparency Regarding News Content
No matter how vehemently they deny it, platforms are playing press
roles. Manipulating the algorithms that surface content is an editorial act.
The choices behind the algorithms help to determine what users consume.
Algorithms are intended to optimize the likelihood that certain content will
be viewed. If we want platforms to prioritize democracy-enhancing content
like investigative journalism, we need to understand platforms’ motivations
as well as how those motivations are put into action through engineering
choices. This Article has attempted to illuminate and categorize those
motivations. Other scholars, notably law and technology scholar Professor
Kate Klonick, have described the way in which Facebook makes decisions

328. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
329. The Trump Administration has selectively barred reporters and revoked press credentials
seemingly in retaliation for unfavorable coverage. See David Folkenflick, Lashing Out Against
Critical Reports, White House Bars Outlets from Briefing, NPR (Feb. 24, 2017, 7:11 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2017/02/24/517112555/lashing-out-against-critical-reports-white-house-barsoutlets-from-briefing; Brian Stelter & David Shortell, White House Backs Down from Legal Fight,
Restores Jim
Acosta’s
Press
Pass,
CNN
(Nov.
19,
2018,
3:53
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/19/media/cnn-acosta-emergency-hearing/index.html.
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about what speech is and is not allowed on its platform. 330 And of late,
Facebook has been more transparent about its editorial role, announcing the
creation of an independent body to make decisions about what content is and
is not permitted on the site. 331
What is needed to supplement this work is an understanding of how
various platforms prioritize (or deprioritize) news in particular. Of critical
importance is understanding whether and how content is tagged as
newsworthy or of legitimate public concern. We need this information to
understand what ends up at the top or the bottom of a news feed; what is
displayed on a single occasion and what is recycled; what is sprayed to many
users and what is limited to a few. In essence: what types of news are
platforms privileging or marginalizing and how? 332
Indications are that the revelations might be concerning. In an article
on how Facebook determines whether to censor posts, Klonick described
how Facebook employees decide whether someone is a public figure: They
search to see if that person’s name appears on Google News. 333 We should
not assume that the engineers manipulating platforms’ algorithms are any
more sophisticated when it comes to imbuing their work with journalistic
values or democratic ideals.
Many have called for algorithmic transparency and to impose that
transparency by law, if necessary. New York Times CEO Mark Thompson
said transparency would be best if it were voluntary, “but even if it requires
regulation or legislation, it must be done—and done promptly.” 334 Polling

330. See generally Klonick, supra note 33, at 1634 (describing a variety of rules and processes
that platforms use to govern speech); Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s “Oversight Board”: Move Fast
With Stable Infrastructure and Humility, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2–3 (2019); Kate Klonick,
Facebook v. Sullivan, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST. (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/facebook-v-sullivan [hereinafter Klonick, Facebook v.
Sullivan]; Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L. J. 1353, 1355–56
(2018) (describing Facebook’s content moderation regime).
331. See Kate Klonick & Thomas Kadri, How to Make Facebook’s ‘Supreme Court’ Work, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/17/opinion/facebook-supreme-courtspeech.html.
332. This proposal is a more news-specific version of one made by Jameel Jaffer of the Knight
First Amendment Institute. He called on platforms to be more transparent generally regarding “how
they’re shaping the speech they’re not taking down.” Jameel Jaffer, Digital Journalism and the
SEC.
(Nov.
13,
2018),
New
Public
Square—Or’
Emet
Lecture,
JUST
https://www.justsecurity.org/61463/digital-journalism-public-square-or-emet-lecture/.
333. Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan, supra note 330.
334. See Fight for the Future, supra note 320; see also Algorithmic Angst: News Corp Chief
Executive Robert Thomson’s “Breaking the News” Keynote, Digital Content Next, DIGITAL
CONTENT NEXT (June 12, 2018), https://digitalcontentnext.org/blog/2018/06/12/algorithmic-angstnews-corp-chief-executive-robert-thomsons-breaking-the-news-keynote/
(calling
for
an
“Algorithm Review Board”).
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suggests the idea has public support. 335 A 2018 study by Gallup and the
Knight Foundation found that eighty-eight percent of those surveyed
believed “internet companies” should “disclose the methods they use to
determine what news items show in their news feeds.” 336
Knowing how algorithms manipulate news would allow press advocates
to challenge those aspects of the algorithm that disadvantage watchdog
reporting. It could also allow journalists to work more collaboratively with
platforms to provide investigative reporting to the public in ways that are
more likely to “scale” (either because of format, placement, or some other
factor) and have wider impact. Moreover, forcing platforms to be more
transparent—especially if it is with the aim of bringing investigative
reporting to broader audiences—might incentivize platforms to make
algorithms friendlier to this brand of journalism.
Of course, platforms are highly resistant to transparency and justify their
secrecy by claiming their algorithms are proprietary. 337 Yet, proprietary
interest should give way to the public interest in understanding how platforms
distribute democracy-enhancing investigative reporting. This is especially
true given, as the Supreme Court recently said, social media websites are, for
many, “the principal sources for knowing current events” and “speaking and
listening in the modern public square.” 338 Moreover, there is precedent,
albeit in a different context, for piercing this shield to reveal information in
the public interest. In November 2018, in response to a lawsuit by
investigative journalists under the Freedom of Information Act, the Labor
Department indicated it would share statistics about the diversity of
workforces at numerous Silicon Valley companies. 339 The Department had
initially argued that these statistics were trade secrets. Thus, proprietary
concerns can give way to public interest.

335. See LEE RAINIE & JANNA ANDERSON, CODE DEPENDENT: PROS AND CONS OF THE
ALGORITHM
AGE
74–83
(2017),
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2017/02/08181534/PI_2017.02.08_Algorithms_FINAL.pdf (cataloguing
calls for algorithmic transparency); Fight for the Future, supra note 320.
336. GALLUP, MAJOR INTERNET COMPANIES AS NEWS EDITORS (2018), https://kf-siteproduction.s3.amazonaws.com/publications/pdfs/000/000/260/original/KnightFoundation_Platfor
msAsEditors_080818.pdf.
337. See Will Oremus, Who Controls Your Facebook Feed, SLATE (Jan. 3, 2016, 8:02 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/cover_story/2016/01/how_facebook_s_news_feed_algor
ithm_works.html (noting that the director of engineering for Facebook’s news feed won’t share
much with a journalist about the code behind news feed’s algorithm due to Facebook’s “fierce
protection of trade secrets”).
338. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
339. See Will Evans & Sinduja Rangarajan, We Got the Government to Reverse Its Longtime
Policy to Get Silicon Valley Diversity Data, REVEAL NEWS (Nov. 15, 2018),
https://www.revealnews.org/blog/we-got-the-government-to-reverse-its-longtime-policy-to-getsilicon-valley-diversity-data/.
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2. Require Platforms to Share Data with Journalists
Platforms amass vast troves of data. User information is the capital of
platforms. As the Cambridge Analytica story helped to reveal, Facebook has
long benefited from sharing user data with numerous partners. 340 If platforms
are willing to share data with partners for their own benefit, they should be
required to share data for the public’s benefit as well. This could be done by
making certain data available to investigative journalists.
Platforms could do this both affirmatively and by request.
Affirmatively, platforms could be required to develop public interest
application programming interfaces (“APIs”), which are portals that would
allow the public to access information on the platforms while protecting
anonymity, trade secrets, and intellectual property. 341 Some have suggested
a public interest API might help to combat misinformation, false advertising,
and election manipulation. 342 A public interest API could also help the public
monitor how platforms are censoring content. 343 Such APIs could supply
extremely useful data to journalists. 344
In addition, however, journalists should be able to readily obtain data
from platforms without fear of legal action. As it stands, journalists use
“scraping”—an increasingly popular and powerful automated process for
extracting data from websites. 345 For example, scraping resulted in an
Atlanta Journal-Constitution story about sex abuse by doctors that was a
finalist for the 2017 Pulitzer Prize for national reporting. 346
Yet, currently, scraping opens up journalists to various forms of civil
and criminal liability. 347 For example, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
340. See Rosenberg & Dance, supra note 170 (describing how Facebook allowed user data to
be shared with app developers); Deepa Seetharaman & Kirsten Grind, Facebook Gave Some
Companies Special Access to Additional Data About Users’ Friends; Small Number of Companies
had Deals that Gave them Access to Data After Others Were Cut Off, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2018,
7:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-gave-some-companies-access-to-additionaldata-about-users-friends-1528490406.
341. See Wael Ghonim & Jake Rashbass, It’s Time to End the Secrecy and Opacity of Social
Media, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2017, 8:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracypost/wp/2017/10/31/its-time-to-end-the-secrecy-and-opacity-of-socialmedia/?utm_term=.a7116399bd25.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. Wael Ghonim and Jake Rashbass propose, among other things, making data available about
“reach and engagement” for all public posts, including a “demographic breakdown of [the posts’]
audience.” Ghonim & Rashbass, supra note 340.
345. D. Victoria Baranetsky, Data Journalism and the Law, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Sept.
19, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center_reports/data-journalism-and-the-law.php/ (describing
scraping as “a data collection technique that usually relies on automation—through bots, crawlers,
or applications—to extract data from a website”).
346. See id.
347. See id.
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(“CFAA”) bars knowing access to “a protected computer without
authorization” and thereby obtaining “anything of value.” 348 No journalist
has been prosecuted under the statute, but journalistic sources have. 349 Some
circuits read the statute broadly enough that violating platforms’ terms of
service could trigger liability. 350 Although ongoing legal challenges to the
CFAA might lead to protection for scraping by journalists (and others),
consideration should also be given to amending the CFAA to protect
journalists obtaining data in this way. 351 Again, precedent for this exists,
albeit under European law. The General Data Protection Regulation—the
European Union’s sweeping data privacy law—notes that member states
“shall provide for exemptions or derogations” for uses of data “carried out
for journalistic purposes.” 352 The United Kingdom is among the member
states that have enacted such protections. 353
3. Incentivize Platforms to Own the Press Label
Law could also do more to require platforms to own up to the press label.
Platforms could be incentivized to hire journalists and could be monitored by
journalists in the hope of starting to collapse the dichotomies that were
described in Part II. Perhaps journalistic values could start to infiltrate
platform ones.
Platforms have employees who censor content by employing elaborate
and shifting standards. 354 Journalists could help make sounder decisions
when it comes to manipulating Facebook’s News Feed algorithm. Jonathan
Albright, the director of the Digital Forensics Initiative at Columbia
University’s Tow Center for Digital Journalism, found that even a handful of
people can have a great impact on the quality of information on the
platform. 355 He suggested, for example, that if Google had a “Platform
Editor,” it might have seriously staunched the flow of disinformation in the
wake of the 2017 Las Vegas shooting. 356 Albright said, “I do know that one
person could have stopped that. And I do know that a group of people

348. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012).
349. See Baranetsky, supra note 345.
350. See id.
351. See id.; Jaffer, supra note 332.
352. European Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679, General Data Protection
Regulation, art. 85.
353. Jaffer, supra note 332.
354. Klonick, supra note 33, at 1630–58.
355. Laura Hazard Owen, News in a Disintegrating Reality: Tow’s Jonathan Albright on What
to Do as Things Crash Around Us, NIEMANLAB (Feb. 28, 2018, 11:43 AM),
http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/02/news-in-a-disintegrating-reality-tows-jonathan-albright-onwhat-to-do-as-things-crash-around-us/.
356. Id.
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working together—even if it involves deliberation, even if they don’t agree
on one specific thing—can often solve problems that appear or are starting to
surface because of automation.” 357
Law could incentivize such hiring through a Work Opportunity Tax
Credit. This tax credit has been used to combat unemployment and
incentivize companies to hire from groups that face barriers to employment
such as veterans and previously incarcerated individuals. 358 In the past
decade journalists have lost jobs at alarming rates while platforms have
profited from investigative reporting and other journalist-created news. 359
Promoting the jobs of journalists focused on core First Amendment speech
could be a sound use of the credit.
4. Counteracting the Platform Monopoly
Concern about concentrated power over the press has a long history. In
1947, the Commission of Freedom of the Press, also known as the Hutchins
Commission, concluded that freedom of the press was in grave danger
because few had access to the press, and those few did not always wield their
power ethically. 360 In the 1990s, pointing to a steep rise in the number of
cities with a single newspaper, First Amendment scholar Lee C. Bollinger
noted that “[m]any commentators commonly believe, in fact, that the
problem is worse now than in 1947.” 361
Now, a quarter century later, the concern is arguably even more
pressing. 362 As noted, the profits of Facebook or Google alone exceed that
of the entire newspaper industry. 363 Platforms are behemoths suctioning up
advertising dollars that once funded journalism. Precedent exists for using
anti-monopoly law to ensure that news is not controlled by a select few. For
357. Id.
358. See 26 U.S.C. § 51 (2012).
359. See Elizabeth Grieco, U.S. Newsroom Employment Has Dropped by a Quarter Since 2008,
with Greatest Decline at Newspapers, PEW RES. CTR. (July 9, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/09/u-s-newsroom-employment-has-dropped-by-aquarter-since-2008/; The Editors, The Layoff Tracker, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://www.cjr.org/analysis/journalism-layofftracker.php?ct=t(Top_Stories_CJR_new_Jan_26_
1_25_2017_COPY_01)&mc_cid=8016dcc648&mc_eid=39a02722a4. Although it may be obvious
that Facebook needs content in order to be profitable, the fact that it has started paying some
publishers for news is evidence of the value of news specifically. See Craig Timberg, Facebook to
Offer “News Tab” for Users—and Pay (Some) Publishers for Their Work, WASH. POST (Oct. 23,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/23/facebook-offer-news-tab-userspay-some-publishers-their-work/.
360. See COMM’N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 1 (1947).
361. Lee C. Bollinger, Why There Should Be an Independent Decennial Commission on the
Press, 1993 U. CHI. L.F. 1, 9 (1993).
362. See OPEN MARKETS INST., supra note 276 (describing the problem of “the concentration
of power over reporters and news publishers by giant ‘platform monopolists’”).
363. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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example, in 1945, in Associated Press v. United States, 364 the Supreme Court
held that the Associated Press membership requirements violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act by preventing non-members from getting access to
news created by members. 365 The Court noted that the First Amendment
“rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare
of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society.” 366 It added:
“Freedom to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to
combine to keep others from publishing is not.” 367
Recently, movement is afoot on the anti-monopoly front. The Federal
Trade Commission and Justice Department are investigating competition in
the tech industry. 368 The House Judiciary Committee has also launched an
antitrust probe of platforms. 369 Yet, next steps and how they will impact
news specifically are far from certain. Even advocacy groups are not clear
about how best to use antitrust law to protect the news business. 370 More
thinking needs to be done about how best to create more robust competition
in the Networked Press environment.
In the meantime, Congress should consider exempting news
organizations from antitrust laws so that they might band together in an
attempt to exert pressure on platforms. For example, the Journalism
Competition and Preservation Act of 2018 would create a temporary safe
harbor from antitrust laws for publishers to collectively negotiate with
platforms regarding the terms on which their content may be used. 371 The
bill is being pushed by the News Media Alliance, which represents almost

364. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
365. Id. at 21–23.
366. Id. at 20.
367. Id.
368. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC’s Bureau of Competition Launches Task Force
to Monitor Technology Industry (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2019/02/ftcs-bureau-competition-launches-task-force-monitor-technology; Press Release,
Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Reviewing the Practices of Market-Leading Online Platforms,
(July 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reviewing-practices-marketleading-online-platforms.
369. See Ryan Tracy, House Committee Requests Tech Executives’ Emails in Antitrust Probe,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2019, 3:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-committee-requeststech-executives-emails-in-antitrust-probe-11568377800.
370. See OPEN MARKETS INST., supra note 276 (“At the Open Markets Institute, we believe the
American people have both a right and a duty to use government to ensure the independence and
financial viability of both national and locally based news organizations. Although it is by no means
clear yet what specific regulatory actions and policy decisions Americans should take today, at OMI
we believe that a close study of American history will help citizens identify a set of clear goals as
to the type of journalism we want and need, and the principles by which to achieve those goals.”).
371. See Journalism Competition and Preservation Act of 2018, H.R. 5190, 115th Cong. (2018);
Tiku, supra note 12.
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2000 news organizations. 372 As the CEO of that organization, David
Chavern, said in an op-ed, “the least the government can do is get out of the
way and let publishers protect themselves and their readers.” 373
B. Bolstering Investigative Journalism
With regard to bottom-up legal possibilities, they could take several
forms, including more significant government funding of the press, better
enforcement (and some expansion) of laws around newsgathering, and
broadening the Corporation for National and Community Service (which
spearheads AmeriCorps) to include a journalism component.
1. Enhanced Public Funding of the Press
Some journalists would dismiss public funding outright as anathema to
their role as watchdog. Yet, more robust public funding needs to at least be
on the menu of options. Watchdog reporting is the most expensive type of
reporting, and part of the reason it flourished in the 1960s and 1970s was that
news organizations were better able to afford it. 374 As profits have been
squeezed by platforms, investigative reporting is often the first thing
newsrooms slash. 375
Public funding of the press is not a new concept. The newspaper
industry, in fact, is likely indebted to the American government for its very
existence. 376 The Post Office Act of 1792 377 made mailing a newspaper
cheaper than sending a letter (and free if it was being sent to another
newspaper), and so newspapers could cheaply reach readers in far-flung
locations. 378 This gave the fledgling newspaper industry both a distribution
372. See About Us, NEWS MEDIA ALLIANCE, https://www.newsmediaalliance.org/about-us/;
Congressman David Cicilline to Introduce Anti-Trust Safe Harbor Bill for Newspaper Companies,
NEWS MEDIA ALLIANCE (Feb. 25, 2018), https://www.newsmediaalliance.org/release-safe-harborbill/.
373. David Chavern, Protect the News from Google and Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2018,
4:42
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/protect-the-news-from-google-and-facebook1519594942.
374. See KOVACH & ROSENSTIEL, supra note 37, at 191 (“[I]t is no accident that the rise of
investigative modern reporting in the 1960s coincided with the growing financial strength of news
organizations in print and television.”).
375. See SEYMOUR M. HERSH, REPORTER: A MEMOIR 4 (2018) (asking in the Introduction,
“Where are the tough stories today about America’s continuing Special Forces operations and the
never-ending political divide in the Middle East, Central America, and Africa? Abuses surely
continue—war is always hell—but today’s newspapers and networks simply cannot afford to keep
correspondents in the field”).
376. Anuj C. Desai, The Transformation of Statutes into Constitutional Law: How Early Post
Office Policy Shaped Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 671, 688 (2007).
377. Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 232.
378. See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY & JOHN NICHOLS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AMERICAN
JOURNALISM: THE MEDIA REVOLUTION THAT WILL BEGIN THE WORLD AGAIN 122–25 (2010);
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network and a heap of content to choose from since newspapers freely
borrowed content from one another. 379 The government has provided the
press a host of other financial incentives in the centuries since. 380
In addition, other democracies fund journalism at much higher levels
than ours. Whereas the United States spends $2.25 per capita to fund media
systems, Canada spends $22, the United Kingdom spends $86, Germany
spends $107, and Norway spends $135. 381 In numerous Western European
countries, public news organizations are well-funded and powerful enough
that they are the top news sources for citizens. 382 For example, the BBC is
the main news source for forty-eight percent of adults in the United
Kingdom. 383
In terms of convincing lawmakers to provide funding for journalism,
recent research suggests watchdog reporting actually saves local
communities money. A study by economists at Notre Dame and the
University of Illinois at Chicago found that when a local newspaper shuts
down and there is less scrutiny of local government, costs for municipal
projects rise. 384 “[I]f you look at the municipal bond market, you can actually
see the financial consequences that have to be borne by local citizens as a
result of newspaper closures,” a study co-author Chang Lee said. 385 Thus, by
funding watchdog journalism, communities may actually save money.
And some politicians have shown a willingness to fund local journalism.
New Jersey legislators created in 2018 a first-of-its-kind “Civic Information

SCHUDSON, supra note 109, at 213; Desai, supra note 376, at 692–95 (discussing subsidies for
newspapers in the 1792 Post Office Act).
379. See SCHUDSON, supra note 109, at 213.
380. See C.W. ANDERSON ET AL., TOW CTR. FOR DIGITAL JOURNALISM, POST-INDUSTRIAL
JOURNALISM:
ADAPTING
TO
THE
PRESENT
4–5
(2014),
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:7sqv9s4mx8 (noting that “[g]ood journalism
has always been subsidized; markets have never supplied as much news as democracy demands”
and defining “subsidy” broadly to include more than “direct government funding”); Erin C. Carroll,
Protecting the Watchdog: Using the Freedom of Information Act to Preference the Press, 2016
UTAH L. REV. 193, 216–17 (2016).
381. See Marlee Baldridge, Water in a News Desert: New Jersey Is Spending $5 Million to Fund
(July
3,
2018,
5:11
PM),
Innovation
in
Local
News,
NIEMANLAB
http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/07/water-in-a-news-desert-new-jersey-is-spending-5-million-tofund-innovation-in-local-news/.
382. See Katerina Eva Matsa, Across Western Europe, Public News Media Are Widely Used
and Trusted Sources of News, PEW RES. CTR. (June 8, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/06/08/western-europe-public-news-media-widely-used-and-trusted/ (noting that in seven
Western European countries surveyed, a public news organization was the top main news source).
383. See id.
384. See Kriston Capps, The Hidden Costs of Losing Your City’s Newspaper, CITYLAB (May
30, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/05/study-when-local-newspaper-close-city-bondfinances-suffer/561422/.
385. Id.
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Consortium” and provided it with $5 million in seed money. 386 The
consortium will be affiliated with several New Jersey state universities and
will, according to the law creating it, “provide grants that support news and
information that benefit the [s]tate’s civic life and meet the evolving
information needs of New Jersey’s underserved communities.” 387 Free Press,
the advocacy group that lobbied for the bill, hopes that the Consortium will
train journalists; improve access to government data and other civic
information, especially to low-income communities and communities of
color; and “nurture better civic engagement and dialogue.” 388
2.

Better Enforcement and Expansion of Laws Around
Newsgathering

A second way in which watchdog reporting could be bolstered is better
enforcement and expansion of laws related to newsgathering. One of the
most significant of these laws is the federal Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”) and its state counterparts. 389 Getting information from government
is, obviously, critical to watchdog reporting. Journalists have lamented for
decades that obtaining government records through FOIA is numbingly slow
and sometimes impossible. 390 I have elsewhere argued in favor of
overhauling FOIA’s expedited processing provision to preference
journalists. 391 (Many states have expedited processing provisions as well. 392)
Providing public records to journalists faster could help minimize the amount
of time that makes watchdog reporting particularly difficult given the speed
of information flow today. More dramatically, several scholars have
proposed reimagining FOIA to shift from its “request-and-respond
paradigm” to an affirmative disclosure regime. 393 This shift would also result

386. See Baldridge, supra note 381; Mike Rispoli, Why the Civic Info Consortium Is Such a
Huge Deal, FREE PRESS (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.freepress.net/our-response/expertanalysis/insights-opinions/why-civic-info-consortium-such-huge-deal.
387. See
Assem
B.
3628,
218th
Legis.,
1st
Sess.
(N.J.
2018),
https://legiscan.com/NJ/text/A3628/2018.
388. See Rispoli, supra note 386.
389. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
390. See Carroll, supra note 380, at 214–15.
391. See id. at 196.
392. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-204(3)–(4) (West Supp. 2015).
393. See David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165
U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1148–49 (2017); David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the
Current Legal Landscape of Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1792 (2008)
(arguing for affirmative duty to make environmental information available). Professor Pozen also
made the intriguing suggestion that some consideration be given to shifting the FOIA budget into
subsidies for the press. See Pozen, supra, at 1145.
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in a faster provision of information to journalists. This is essential given the
platform value of speed. 394
Other newsgathering protections could be explored as well. For
example, several scholars have proposed enhanced protections for
whistleblowers. 395 And news organizations have long been trying to pass a
federal reporter’s shield law. 396 Protection for sources is critical given the
nature of the information being collected when the press is acting in its
watchdog role. All of these suggestions would better enable journalists to
produce substantive investigative reporting rather than “content,” the primary
purpose of which is to lure eyes to their publication.
As any enhancement of newsgathering laws is considered, it will be
critical to bring journalists into the conversation. Lawmakers need to better
understand the newsgathering and editorial processes so that they can best
protect journalists. As good as the press is at shining the light on everything
around it, historically the press has not been transparent about its own
journalistic processes. Yet, this is shifting. 397 Today, as disinformation
abounds and trust is in shorter supply, a greater urgency exists for the press
to explain how it goes about its work.
3. Expanding the Corporation for National and Community Service
A third option for bolstering watchdog reporting would be to create a
federally-funded program for journalism akin to AmeriCorps, build out the
existing AmeriCorps program to include journalism, or create a similar
privately-funded organization. 398 This proposal is aimed specifically at

394. See supra Section II.A.4.
395. See Pozen, supra note 393, at 1149.
396. Jonathan Peters, Shield Laws and Journalist’s Privilege: The Basics Every Reporter Should
JOURNALISM
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(Aug.
22,
2016),
Know,
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https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/journalists_privilege_shield_law_primer.php (“There is
no federal shield law despite many attempts by the Society of Professional Journalists and others to
get one passed.”).
397. See Liz Garbus, A View Inside “The Fourth Estate” During Trump’s First Year, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/insider/true-story-the-fourthestate.html; The Washington Post Launches “How to Be a Journalist” Video Series, WASH. POST:
WASHPOSTPR (Dec. 8, 2017, 2:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/pr/wp/2017/12/08/thewashington-post-launches-how-to-be-a-journalist-video-series/?utm_term=.03dcb149cc91.
The
Washington Post editor Marty Baron also said that the paper is looking for ways to combat the
mystery around who journalists are and what they do. See Indira Lakshmanan, Marty Baron: “Fair
and Honest Reporting” Will Be Validated over the Long Run, POYNTER INST. (Dec. 15, 2017),
https://www.poynter.org/news/marty-baron-fair-and-honest-reporting-will-be-validated-overlong-run.
398. Inspiration for this idea came from journalists Deborah and James Fallows. See #295:
Deborah and James Fallows, LONGFORM PODCAST at 59:30 (May 23, 2018),
https://longform.org/posts/longform-podcast-295-deborah-and-james-fallows (describing a “Peace
Corps-like” program to “train the next generation of journalists”).
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bolstering the press’s focus on community and combatting the tendency of
platforms and technology to cater to an audience of one, thereby producing
isolation despite promises of connectivity. 399 It is also aimed at the largest
gap in watchdog reporting and reporting in general—reporting on local
governments.
The AmeriCorps program began in the early 1990s and supports
volunteers in local communities working on a range of issues including
improvements in education, combatting poverty, and disaster
preparedness. 400 It is part of the Corporation for National and Community
Service whose mission is promoting “civic engagement” and building
“strong and sustainable change in the communities [it] serve[s].” 401
Watchdog journalism comfortably fits within this mission.
Members of this journalism service program could be placed in
communities with one or more experienced journalists (depending on the size
of the community) to report on local government. If publication is online,
overhead costs could be kept fairly low. Private models for such programs
exist. 402 Of course, political roadblocks to such a proposal might abound at
the federal level, but this proposal, as well as other “bottom-up” options
outlined in this Section, could be undertaken at the state level. As noted, the
New Jersey Civic Information Consortium is an example of a state
government—seemingly pushed by grassroots organizing and local
communities—taking steps to improve the local news ecology. 403
This overview of top-down and bottom-up possibilities is intentionally
just an overview. The goal is to demonstrate that law beyond the First
Amendment can and should be considered as a tool for protecting and
fostering watchdog journalism. Neither journalists nor lawmakers should
assume that the First Amendment is sufficient. A broad range of options exist
for creating an environment that would foster watchdog reporting. These
options are not mutually exclusive, nor do they all require sweeping
government action.

399. See supra Section II.A.2.
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402. One is Report for America. It “places journalists into local newsrooms to report on undercovered issues and communities.” The Crisis in Journalism Has Become a Crisis for Our
Democracy, REPORT FOR AMERICA, https://www.reportforamerica.org/our-vision/ (last visited Feb.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Journalists often speak of the First Amendment as if it has talismanic
power. The First Amendment has capably protected the Fourth Estate—an
institution that exercised editorial discretion independently to act as a check
on government. In part because of that protection, the Fourth Estate
flourished in the second half of the twentieth century and demonstrated the
power of its watchdog role.
But the press ecology has changed dramatically. The Fourth Estate has
been eclipsed by the Networked Press in which not only journalists but
platforms, algorithms, audiences, and others play significant roles in creating
and distributing news. Until recently, journalists served as information
gatekeepers and were relatively free in their exercise of editorial discretion.
Platforms now host public squares, set their boundaries, and police what
happens in them.
If an institution is an organization based on shared norms and goals, the
Networked Press does not qualify. While platforms are focused on
commodification, personalization, agnosticism, speed, and scale, in contrast,
watchdog journalists are engaged in a deliberate and often time-consuming
process to unearth stories that can impact the community. This is true even
when the stories may not be widely read. The power of the platforms is so
immense—in part because of their hold on advertising dollars—that platform
values are permeating the Networked Press and undermining the conditions
needed for watchdog journalism to thrive. Editorial discretion is not being
exercised in the same way, and watchdog journalism is threatened.
Although the First Amendment largely protected the Fourth Estate, it
does not protect the press from private power. Technology platforms have
amassed that power in a way perhaps never seen before and they have
wielded it—even if unintentionally—against the press. At its core, the role
of the watchdog is to protect against tyranny. Today, that role is significantly
compromised. To protect watchdog journalism some action is needed. Law
should be part of that response.
Various possibilities exist, including algorithmic transparency, sharing
of data, the hiring of journalists by platforms, press exemptions from antitrust
law, subsidies, better enforcement of laws related to newsgathering, and a
corps of volunteer journalists. Some of these are aimed at strengthening the
press, others at weakening platforms. The goal is to reduce the power
asymmetry between the players in the Networked Press, better align platform
and press goals and norms, and create an environment in which watchdog
journalism can thrive.

